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RULE 42(b) BIFURCATION AT AN EXTREME: 
POLYFURCATION OF LIABILITY ISSUES IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL TORT CASES 
Albert P. Bedecarre* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As United States courts become increasingly congested, federal 
judges are resorting to an increasing variety of techniques to control 
the onslaught of litigation. Bifurcation of civil trials into distinct 
phases is a potent weapon in the judicial docket-control arsenal, 
which also includes mandatory court-annexed arbitration and court-
structured settlement conferences. 1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
42(b) (Rule 42(b» provides that a judge may separate any claim or 
issue of a cause of action, 2 thus creating a series of component stages. 
Each segment is then tried successively, with plaintiffs having to 
survive each stage in order to progress to the next, and ultimately 
to be awarded any remedy. 3 
* Editor-in-Chief, 1989-90, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable guidance of Professor Zygmunt Plater, 
and the constant support of Claire Ernst. 
1 Judges at the conference for the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure discussed trends in judicial practice to control overburdened dockets. The Rules 
were intended to be transubstantial, meaning that they applied equally to all causes of action. 
Through the use of local rules, however, judges are resorting to consistently applying methods 
proven effective in certain types of cases. For example, a judge may order arbitration for all 
mass tort claims on her docket. Such non-transubstantial local, and often informal, rules are 
growing in popUlarity to help dispose of as many cases as possible outside the courtroom. 
Interview with Daniel R. Coquillette, Dean, Boston College Law School, in Newton, Mass. 
(Nov. 12, 1988). Dean Coquillette is the Reporter to the Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United States. 
2 Separate trials under Rule 42(b) should be distinguished from severance under Rule 21, 
which provides in part: "Any claim against a party may be severed and proceeded with 
separately." Bifurcated proceedings result in one judgment, while severed claims become 
independent actions that are tried and decided independently. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2387, at 277 (1971 & Supp. 1982). 
3 FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). See infra note 18 for the text of the Rule. 
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The application of Rule 42(b) has expanded since its adoption in 
1938. At first, courts used bifurcation merely to separate disparate 
claims or counterclaims in order to avoid jury confusion or prejudice 
to parties, or to eliminate frivolous claims outright by trying narrow 
threshold issues such as jurisdiction or venue.4 Necessities of court-
rl',om efficiency compelled the extension of bifurcation into new 
areas, eventually leading to separation of liability issues from dam-
ages issues. 5 
By the early 1960s, there was an active debate as to the propriety 
of bifurcating liability and damages in tort cases, which discussed 
the relative benefits and burdens of using Rule 42(b).6 This era of 
discussion, however, did not lead to any substantial reforms regard-
ing application of Rule 42(b). Since then, the propriety of bifurcating 
liability and damages appears to have been taken for granted. 
Recently, some courts have "upped the ante" once more by split-
ting issues within liability to create successive trials on a series of 
discrete issues before damages issues are reached. This new practice 
is referred to as "polyfurcation" in this Comment. 
A concrete example of polyfurcation in an environmental tort case 
illustrates how it works and the kind of trial structure that can result 
in a polyfurcated proceeding. The plaintiffs in a recent toxic tort 
case7 were a group of neighboring suburban residents who alleged 
that the defendants had polluted the municipal wells servicing their 
homes, and thereby had caused a variety of ailments including leu-
kemia. Over the plaintiffs' strenuous objections, the court adopted 
a polyfurcated trial structure suggested by the defendants. 8 The 
judge ordered a four-phase structure with the following separate 
trials: first on causation of the well water contamination alleged to 
have caused the plaintiffs' illnesses; second on causation of the plain-
tiffs' leukemias; third on causation of the plaintiffs' other health 
4 See Note, Separate Trial of a Claim or Issue in Modern Pleading: Rule 42(.b) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 MINN. L. REV. 743, 745-59 (1955). 
• See Miner, Court Congestion: A New Approach, 45 A.B.A. J. 1265 (1959). Judge Miner 
of the Northern District of Illinois was instrumental in promulgating Local Rule 21 in 1959, 
which provided for routine bifurcation of liability and damages in personal injury and other 
civil cases in that district. 
6 See, e.g., Note, supra note 4 (opposing such bifurcation); Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation 
of Jury Negligence Trials: An Example of the Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 
VAND. L. REV. 831 (1961) (opposing bifurcation); Miner, supra note 5 (favoring bifurcation); 
Zeisel & Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis, 76 HARV. L. REV. 
1606 (1963) (favoring bifurcation). 
7 Anderson v. W.R. Grace Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1222 (D. Mass. 1986). 
8 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Trial Plan at 1-5, Anderson v. Cryovac (No. 82-
1672-S) (1986). 
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problems; and fourth on damages. 9 For the plaintiffs to be awarded 
any damages, therefore, they had to win all three of the causation 
trials. 
Polyfurcation of this type has provoked claims of undue prejudice 
by both plaintiffs and defendants, similar to claims made in the 1960s 
in opposition to bifurcation of liability and damages. Polyfurcation, 
however, has not elicited any scholarly debate until now. Litigants 
opposing polyfurcation orders have repeated the arguments of their 
predecessors, including the claim that this use of Rule 42(b) violates 
the right to a jury trial. lO Multiple divisions within liability, they 
have contended, prevent the parties from presenting the circum-
stances of their entire liability case to a jury, thereby severely 
limiting the traditional role of that body.11 The first court to order 
liability polyfurcation noted that a jury trial limited to the issue of 
causation could create a "sterile or laboratory atmosphere in which 
causation is parted from the reality of injury. "12 
Subsequent to that first polyfurcated tort trial, three major en-
vironmental cases have had polyfurcation of liability issues. 13 Liabil-
ity in environmental tort litigation often presents novel questions 
linked to the particular circumstances encountered by the particular 
plaintiffs before the court.14 Polyfurcation of such unique issues may 
fundamentally affect environmental cases by imposing trial struc-
tures that segregate crucial causation issues from the other related 
liability issues. 15 
This Comment analyzes the suitability of subjecting liability to 
multiple divisions in the context of environmental tort cases that 
9 Pacelle, Contaminated Verdict, Am. Law., Dec. 1986, at 77, col. 2. 
10 See, e.g., In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Product Liability Litigation, 624 F. 
Supp. 1212, 1221-22 (S.D. Ohio 1985). 
11 Id. 
12 In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 F.2d 207, 217 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929 
(1983). 
13 In re "Agent Orange" Products Liability Litigation, 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N. Y. 1983); 
Bendectin, 624 F. Supp. 1212; Anderson, 628 F. Supp. 1219. 
14 See Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-In-Fact Rules For Indeterminate 
Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REV. 881 (1982); Brennan, Causal Clwins and Statistical Links: The 
Role of Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469 
(1988). 
15 Rule 42(b) can be a particularly troubling device in the environmental context. The 
conclusions reached in this Comment, however, should not be restricted to the environmental 
context, and may provide a useful paradigm for assessing the propriety of polyfurcation in a 
wide range of cases involving Rule 42(b). Bifurcation of liability from damages has been used 
in cases involving antitrust, patents, personal injury, and property damage. See 9 C. WRIGHT 
& A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 2390, at 297 n.49. 
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have employed polyfurcation. This Comment's purpose is to initiate 
new discussion and debate about Rule 42(b) in order to address the 
propriety of polyfurcation generally. Section II discusses the history 
and evolution of bifurcation under Rule 42(b). Section II also reviews 
the potential problems created by bifurcation, and traces the original 
dehate over bifurcation of liability and damages. Section III intro-
duces three environmental tort cases in which courts have utilized 
polyfurcation. In light of these cases, section IV analyzes the prob-
lems caused by polyfurcating liability issues in these cases. Section 
IV then proposes a set of guidelines as a possible alternative to 
unfettered judicial discretion in making the polyfurcation decision. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF BIFURCATION UNDER RULE 42(B) 
A. The Scope of the Rule 
Promulgation of the first Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 
in 1938 constituted an effort to consolidate legal and equitable pro-
cedures, and to collapse these two parallel systems of justice into 
one integrated system. 16 The drafters intended the Rules to be "tran-
substantial," meaning they would apply to all civil actions equally, 
unlike the idiosyncratic, traditional procedural system which had 
distinct procedures for law and equity cases, as well as for different 
causes of action in either area. 17 
Specifically, the drafters of Rule 42(b)lS intended it to provide 
judges with a tool to separate claims and issues brought together in 
the same case under the liberal joinder rules of the FRCP. This 
separation, the drafters thought, would help to avoid excessive con-
fusion or prejudice due to overly complex or inappropriately joined 
trials. 19 Prior to the promulgation of the FRCP, the practice of 
16 FED. R. Cry. P. 1-2. 
17 [d. 
18 Rule 42(b) provides: 
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate 
trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any 
claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or any separate issue or any 
number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues, always 
preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as described by the Seventh Amendment 
to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States. 
FED. R. Cry. P. 42(b). 
19 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rules 18 through 20 set the guidelines for 
joinder of claims and parties, both permissive and required. In addition, Rule 22 allows 
interpleader actions and Rule 24 allows intervention, both as a right and permissibly. See 
Note, supra note 4, at 743-44. 
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hearing issues separately had some antecedents in England's com-
mon law20 and equity21 courts, as well as in some jurisdictions within 
the United States.22 Courts did not routinely employ the existing 
statutory devices or precedents for separating issues at the time of 
the FRCP's adoption. 23 
On its face, Rule 42(b) appears to encourage bifurcation, and has 
been so interpreted by some courtS. 24 The Rule grants judges ex-
tremely broad discretion as to what may be bifurcated and when, 
thus ensuring great flexibility in structuring litigation.25 The three 
allowable grounds for a bifurcation decision-furthering conve-
nience, avoiding prejudice, and furthering expedition and economy-
are set out in the alternative, so that the presence of anyone basis 
is sufficient to sustain such an order.26 The bifurcation decision, 
therefore, is committed to the trial court's "informed discretion,"27 
based on achieving one or more of these three goals.28 In every 
decision about whether to bifurcate in a specific instance, a trial 
judge must balance the burden imposed on the parties against the 
potential benefits, and deny separation where the burdens outweigh 
the benefits. 29 
Significantly, however, the drafters added an express limitation 
on a judge's power under the Rule in a 1966 amendment emphasizing 
preservation of the right to a trial by jury.30 The Advisory Commit-
20 Blackstone described the action of account-render, which involved a two-stage trial in 
which the existence of the account was decided prior to deciding how much the defendant 
owed plaintiff on the account. 3 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *164. More recently, the 
Rules of the Supreme Court of Judicature provided that "the court or judge may, in any case 
or matter, at any time or from time to time, order that ... one or more questions of fact be 
tried before the others ... and in all cases may order that one or more issues of fact be tried 
before any other or others." Mayers, The Severance for Trial of Liability from Damage, 86 
U. PENN. L. REV. 389, 391-93 (1938) (quoting Rules of the English Supreme Court of 
Judicature (1883) order 36, rule 8). 
21 Equity Rule 29 (1911) (allowed separate hearings on separate issues). 
22 Mayers cited to a 1907 New York statute that provided courts the discretion to order one 
or more issues to be tried separately prior to any trial of the other issues in the case. Mayers, 
supra note 20, at 398. 
23 Id. at 397-98. 
24 See Miner, supra note 5. 
25 See In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 69 F.R.D. 310, 318-19 (C.D. Cal. 1975); see 
also 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 2388. 
26 See Paris Air Crash, 69 F.R.D. at 319. 
27 Moss v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 23, 26 (6th Cir. 1965) (quoting Frasier v. 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 119 F. Supp. 495, 497 (D. Neb. 1954)). 
28 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 2388, at 283 ("The major consideration ... 
must be which procedure is more likely to result in a just final disposition of the litigation. "). 
29 Id. § 2389, at 286-87. 
30 See supra note 18 for the text of Rule 42(b). 
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tee's Note submitted with the amendment stated that "separation 
of issues for trial is not to be routinely ordered," despite the wide 
latitude in which judicial discretion operates. 31 The Advisory Com-
mittee also emphasized that the Rule "may give rise to problems" 
in light of a constitutional or statutory right to trial by jury, and 
proffered this potential conflict as a reason for the amended Rule's 
express reiteration of Rule 38's command concerning the protection 
of that right. 32 
Like the 1966 amendment, the Rules Enabling Act (REA)33 also 
represents a potential limit on use of bifurcation. The REA confirmed 
that the FRCP "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right," including the right to jury trial guaranteed by the seventh 
amendment. 34 Most courts, however, have not interpreted the REA 
strictly when considering what constitutes change in substantive 
rights or infringement upon the common-law right to a jury trial. 35 
Rule 42(b) was one component in the system of civil procedure 
that standardized the federal civil practice of the United States. 
Although splitting of claims and issues had some historical anteced-
ents, it was new to most United States jurisdictions. The broad 
discretionary power that Rule 42(b) granted to federal judges has 
few limitations, and several broad goals serve as grounds for using 
that power. 
31 Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 113 (1966). The Note cites to Professor 
Weinstein's 1961 article containing serious criticisms of routine bifurcation of liability and 
damages on the grounds that it infringes upon the traditional role of the jury. See Weinstein, 
supra note 6, which is discussed further infra at notes 101-18 and accompanying text. 
32 39 F.R.D. at 113. The Committee cites to United Airlines v. Weiner, 286 F.2d 302 (9th 
Cir. 1961) as an example of the potential problems that accompany separation. Weiner over-
turned an order separating the liability and damages phases of the consolidated action of 23 
plaintiffs arising out of a mid-air collision. 286 F.2d at 306. The court held that the two issues 
were not so distinct as to be separable, and that they could not be tried separately without 
jury confusion and uncertainty. Id.; see also Wright, The Federal Courts a Century After 
Appomattox, 52 A.B.A. J. 742, 747 (1966) (member of the Advisory Committtee suggests that 
the Advisory Committee purposely took no position on severing liability and damages in the 
civil context while approving its customary use in admiralty cases because of then-Professor 
Weinstein's view that separation prevented the jury's "tempering" of the substantive law with 
a social conscience). 
33 Federal Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1938). 
34 Id. 
35 See, e.g., Colgrove v. Battin, 456 F.2d 1379 (1972), afl'd, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) (so long as 
a jury is not denied in cases for which the common law guaranteed a jury, the choice of 
procedures will not offend these rights); Burlington R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987) (Rules 
that "incidentally affect" parties' substantive rights do not violate the Rules Enabling Act 
(REA) if "reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of that system of rules. "). 
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B. Judicial Interpretation, Employment, and Development of 
Rule J,2(b) 
Going beyond the text of Rule 42(b) and the REA, the courts have 
developed tests for bifurcating claims and issues. The United States 
Supreme Court case of Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining 
CO.36 serves as a fundamental judicial guideline for determining the 
propriety of separating issues under Rule 42(b).37 Gasoline Products 
involved an appeals court order for partial retrial of the measure of 
damages in a contract case. 38 In reversing that order, the Supreme 
Court set out the standards for trying issues independently. 39 
Under the Gasoline Products rule, an issue may be tried indepen-
dently if it is "so distinct and separable from the others that a trial 
of it alone may be had without injustice. "40 The Court stressed that 
a jury must have all the evidence necessary to establish the existence 
of the material facts underlying a plaintiff's claim.41 If issues are "so 
interwoven" that they cannot be submitted to a jury without causing 
jurors "confusion and uncertainty," then they must be tried to-
gether.42 
Significantly, the Court held that submission to a jury of improp-
erly separated issues would amount to a denial of a fair trial in 
violation of the seventh amendment. 43 Thus, the Court held that the 
right to a jury trial encompasses not only the guaranteed presence 
of a jury, but also the guaranty that juries will hear interdependent 
issues together. The particular frailties of juries, while decried by 
some, were not the overriding concern of the Court in making this 
decision. The Court focused instead on avoiding confusion of the 
trier of fact due to incomplete information. The Gasoline Products 
Court recognized the desirability of hearing issues separately, but 
at the same time emphasized a court's obligations to the interests of 
the party opposing separation. 
36 283 U.S. 494 (1931). 
37 Even though Gasoline Products was decided seven years before the adoption of the 
FRCP, it is the definitive Supreme Court holding on separating issues for trial, or retrial as 
in Gasoline Products itself. See Weiner, supra note 32, at 304-06; 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 
supra note 2, § 2391, at 303. 
38 Gasoline Products, 283 U.S. at 496-97. 
39 I d. at 500-01. 
4°Id. at 500. 
41Id. 
42 Id. Specifically, the Court held that, because issues regarding the formation and breach 
of the contract as well as its scope were not clear on the record or in the verdict, the issue of 
damages alone could not be retried without a trial on liability. 
43Id. 
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Courts routinely apply the elements laid out in Gasoline Products 
to make the bifurcation decision for separate trials as well as for 
retrial. 44 The criteria have evolved over time for determining what 
issues are sufficiently "distinct and separable." The continuing ques-
tion is the extent to which judicial balancing between protection of 
parties' rights and judicial efficiency has tilted increasingly toward 
the latter. 
1. Claim Bifurcation 
Passage of Rule 42(b) did not cause an immediate change in the 
way courts tried civil cases in the United States. Initially, judges 
were restrained in their application of the new Rule, and tended to 
use it in order to separate compound claims, not issues.45 An obvious 
use of Rule 42(b) bifurcation arises when a complex claim is brought 
against a party who then counterclaims with a completely different 
cause of action. 46 The resulting unified trial of the two or more 
separate claims would be so complicated for a jury that judges have 
not been reluctant to separate them. 47 
A similar exercise of the Rule 42(b) power common in the Rule's 
early history involved the separation of divergent claims, based on 
separate proofs, brought in one suit by a plaintiff.48 From the time 
of the Rule's adoption, however, some courts have refused to sepa-
rate different claims when the jury would be overly confused as a 
result of not being presented the complete factual picture elicited in 
unified trials. 49 
Another common application of the Rule occurs when a court can 
dispose of one or more claims relatively easily before moving on to 
44 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 2391, at 303. 
45 See generally Note, supra note 4. 
46 See, e.g., Society of European Stage Authors and Composers v. WCAU Broadcasting 
Co., 35 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Pa. 1940) (claim for copyright infringement; defendant responded 
with an antitrust counterclaim). 
47 See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 3 F.R.D. 50 (W.D. Pa. 1943) 
(antitrust counterclaim bifurcated in patent infringement case); Zenith Radio v. Radio Corp. 
of Am., 106 F. Supp. 561 (D. Del. 1952) (patent infringement counterclaim bifurcated in patent 
infringement case). But cf Reliable Mach. Works v. Futurex Mach. Corp. of Am., 11 F.R.D. 
525 (S.D.N. Y. 1951) (separate trials denied for complex antitrust counterclaim in patent 
infringement case). 
48 See, e.g., Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 83,87 (2d Cir. 1939) (Clark, 
J., concurring) ("Here the evidence to support the first claim would to a considerable extent 
be different from, and in addition to, that for the second claim, and there would be little, if 
any, gain in forcing them always to be adjudicated together."). 
49 See, e.g., Suffin v. Springer, 1 F.R.D. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). 
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other claims. 50 An example of this type of case is one containing a 
claim that will obviously fail to withstand assertion of a statute of 
limitations or other affirmative defense. Such claims can be elimi-
nated by summary judgment, leaving only viable claims for full 
trial. 51 Bifurcation in such cases promotes judicial convenience by 
shortening trial time, and saves parties the time and expense of 
trying specious claims. 
The avoidance of prejudice provides another recurring basis for 
bifurcating claims. For example, automobile negligence cases were 
relatively novel and consumed a great deal of court time when the 
Supreme Court adopted the FRCP.52 Among the earliest problems 
noted by commentators wr.s the question of the effectiveness of 
concealing the defendant's automobile insurance from the jury by 
separating plaintiffs' claims against drivers and insurers for individ-
ual trials. 53 Nonetheless, most courts continued to bifurcate auto-
mobile negligence trials to avoid potential prejudice, however spec-
ulative, to defendants. 54 
Courts also separate claims if evidence of a defendant's alleged 
misconduct in relation to one claim might improperly influence the 
jury to rule against the defendant on other claims. 55 Also, in personal 
injury cases brought by mUltiple plaintiffs, one with injuries of a 
particularly gruesome nature, the courts occasionally separated the 
plaintiffs' claims for individual trial. 56 Absent such separation, a 
jury's decision regarding both plaintiffs might be influenced, con-
sciously or unconsciously, by the nature of one plaintiff's injuries. 57 
50 See Collins, 106 F.2d at 85-86 (easily decided claim separated from more difficult claim 
in which the facts not too closely connected). 
51 E.g., Meikle v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 44 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Mich. 1942); California 
Apparel Creators v. Wieder of Cal., Inc., 68 F. Supp. 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). 
In modern practice, the judge could simply order pretrial summary judgment on the failing 
claim at the pleading stage without bifurcating the proceedings to do so. FED. R. CIV. P. 56; 
see also C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 2387, at 278. 
52 See generally Mayers, supra note 20. 
53 See DeParq & Wright, Impleader of Defendant's Insurer Under Modern Pleading Rules, 
38 MINN. L. REV. 229, 233-35 (1954) (questioning the ability to hide the presence of auto 
insurance in light of its widespread use and what the jury learns in voir dire). 
Rule 411 of the Federal Rules of Evidence maintains this exclusion of insurance coverage 
evidence when offered to prove liability. 
54 See Note, supra note 4, at 751. The prejudice to be avoided occurs when the jury brings 
a verdict against the defendant driver thinking that the driver's insurance company will 
actually pay. 
55 Id. at 752; see, e.g., Utilities Natural Gas Corp. v. Hill, 239 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1951) (contract claim separated from fraudulent shifting of assets because of prejudice to 
defendants on the former by the latter). 
56 See, e.g., Baker v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 11 F.R.D. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
57 See Note, supra note 4, at 752. 
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2. Issue Bifurcation 
Bifurcation of issues within a single claim has had a slower and 
more controversial development than has claim separation. The most 
basic reason for granting a separate trial for a single issue is the 
rationale that a trial of one issue may be dispositive of the entire 
case. 58 Some courts, alternatively, split issues in order to avoid undue 
prejudice to a party created by joint hearing of certain issues. 59 
Following the adoption of Rule 42(b), the types of issues that first 
appeared to be separated regularly were threshold questions such 
as jurisdiction60 and venue. 61 Even these procedural issues have not 
been separated when they were intertwined with the merits of the 
claim. 62 
Affirmative defenses provide another category of potentially dis-
positive issues that may be decided with relative ease, and are 
therefore ripe for bifurcation. Separate trials on the issues of re-
lease,63 statute of limitations,64 and estoppel65 are examples of the 
earliest issue separation applications of Rule 42(b). The FRCP allows 
for pre-trial pleading and determination of jurisdictional questions ,66 
as well as determination of the merits of affirmative defenses. 67 When 
appropriate, courts can now dispose of these issues through partial 
or complete summary judgment at the pleading stage. 68 
Judges also have discretion to separate substantive issues. Over 
time, judges appear to have expanded their conception of what 
substantive issues are suitable for bifurcation. The propriety of split-
58 See id. at 755. But cf. H.B. Fuller Co. v. National Starch & Chern. Corp., 595 F. Supp 
622, 625 (D. Del. 1984) ("It is true of any case that a separate trial on a dispositive iss\le 
might save some time and energy; however, that fact has not led to the routine bifurcation of 
trial for the simple reason that judicial economy is not the be all and the end all of the 
administration of justice. "). 
59 See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 2388, at 281-82; see also In re Paris Air 
Crash of March 3, 1974, 69 F.R.D. 310, 319-22 (C.D. Cal. 1975). 
60 E.g., Glaspell v. Davis, 2 F.R.D. 301 (D. Or. 1942). 
61 E.g., Clark v. Lowden, 48 F. Supp. 261 (D. Minn. 1942). 
62 See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 2389, at 293-94; see also Cain v. Blumberg, 
51 F. Supp. 234 (1943) (in personal injury action, defendant's request to determine whether 
amount necessary for diversity was met was denied because delay of consideration of the 
merits would make the actual extent of injury determination difficult, and diversity determi-
nation would take nearly as much time as the merits themselves). 
63 E.g., Ross v. Service Lines, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Ill. 1940). 
64 E.g., Seaboard Terminals Corp. v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 30 F. Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 
1939). 
65 E.g., Momand v. Paramount Pictures Distrib. Co., 6 F.R.D. 222 (D. Mass. 1946). 
66 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
67 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8, 12. 
68 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
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ting liability from damages has been disputed since the adoption of 
the FRCP.69 At that time, the practice of trying liability and damages 
issues together, in the view of one commentator who advocated issue 
separation, was "well-nigh universal; ... an application to a trial 
court to sever the two issues would doubtless be received with 
astonishment by the average judge."70 With the adoption of Rule 
42(b), judges slowly began to bifurcate liability issues for determi-
nation before the damages inquiry in particular cases, but this prac-
tice was clearly the exception rather than the rule. 71 
Two areas where substantive issue bifurcation received early at-
tention were patent and copyright infringement. Cases in these areas 
include liability elements that courts commonly considered separate 
and distinct enough to bifurcate from the rest of the claim. 72 In 
patent cases, the separated liability issues include the validity of the 
patent,73 and, in some cases, the actual infringement issue. 74 Most 
commonly, validity and infringement have been separated for trial 
together before damages issues were heard. 75 Courts deemed bifur-
cation acceptable in these cases because the liability issues were 
logically and easily separable from the subsequent damages issues. 76 
The complexity of damage determinations in such cases also made 
bifurcation desirable. 77 Courts generally granted bifurcation only in 
cases meeting both of these criteria: when the second trial would 
not be repetitious and when the questions would be complicated 
even if heard alone. 78 
69 See, e.g., Note, Original Separate Trials on Issues of Damages and Liability, 48 VA. L. 
REV. 99 (1962) (favoring bifurcation); Note, Separation of Issues of Liability and Damages 
in Personal Injury Cases: An Attempt to Combat Congestion by Rule of Court, 46 IOWA L. 
REV. 815 (1961) (favoring bifurcation). 
70 Mayers, supra note 20, at 398 (footnote omitted). Mayers found a single case, Rockaway 
Pacific Corp. v. State, 200 A.D. 172, 193 N.Y.S. 62 (1922), in which liability and damages 
were tried separately, but the separation was agreed to by both parties at the time of trial. 
Id. at 398 n.26. 
71 See Bowen v. Manuel, 144 So. 2d 341, 343 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (bifurcation of 
liability and damages "should be the exception rather than the usual practice"). 
72 See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 2389, at 286-88. 
73 E.g., Woburn Degreasing Co. of N.J. v. Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc., 37 F. Supp. 311 
(W.D.N.Y. 1941). 
74 E.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 106 F. Supp. 561 (D. Del. 1952). 
75 E.g., Lylophile-Cryochem Corp. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 7 F.R.D. 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1947). 
76 Note, supra note 4, at 760. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 760-61; see also Rickenbacher Transp., Inc. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 3 F.R.D. 202 
(S.D.N.Y. 1942) (first negligence case found in which liability was tried prior to damages). In 
Rickenbacher, the defendant's train struck the plaintiff's truck. The truck was carrying 
shipments from 35 consignors from across the country, all of whom would have been required 
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3. Bifurcation of Liability and Damages in Personal Injury 
Litigation 
The most hotly debated development in issue bifurcation, and the 
slowest to gain acceptance for common usage, has been the separa-
tion of liability from damages in personal injury tort litigation. 79 
Courts still disagree about the propriety of regularly separating the 
two issues in this type of litigation. 80 
An early example of liability and damages bifurcation in a personal 
injury case was the famous Texas City Disaster Litigation. 81 Texas 
City was a massive products liability action against the United 
States, reSUlting from the explosion of two docked ships loaded with 
government-manufactured fertilizer. Texas City was a consolidated 
case of 273 suits. 82 An initial finding of no liability precluded the 
need to determine individual damages for the 8,485 plaintiffs.83 The 
use of bifurcation in this early case might be explained by the po-
tential complexity of damage determinations that would have been 
necessary in a unified presentation, as in the patent and copyright 
cases discussed above. 84 
A related reason why separate trials for liability and damages 
were held in this case was the fact that there were so many plaintiffs 
joined in the same trial. 85 When possible, courts separate issues 
common to all plaintiffs in class actions and other large multi-party 
litigation to avoid duplicative fact determinations. 86 Whatever the 
to give damages testimony. Therefore, the judge split the case. Because the jury found for 
the defendant on the liability issues, presentation of this complicated testimony was avoided. 
79 See infra notes 96-108 and accompanying text. 
80 See, e.g., Taft v. Pontarelli, 100 F.R.D. 19,21 (D.R.I. 1983) ("just determinations are to 
be preferred in any system of justice to either those which are speedy or inexpensive"); Lis 
v. Robert Packer Hosp., 579 F.2d 819,824 (3d Cir. 1978) ("We are advised that where district 
courts have adopted a general bifurcation rule, a heated controversy among the commentators 
and the profession has resulted .... Thus a routine order of bifurcation in all negligence cases 
is a practice at odds with our requirement that discretion be exercised and seems to run 
counter to the intention of the rule drafters. "). 
81 197 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1952), aff'd, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). 
82 ld. at 773. 
83 Id. at 781. 
84 Additionally, the fact that there was no right to a jury trial in the Federal Tort Claims 
Act, under which the plaintiffs filed, might have influenced the court to allow bifurcation. See 
Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 933 (1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C. 2402 
(1982)); see also Comment, Bifurcation of Liability and Damages in Rule 23(b)(3) Class 
Actions: History, Policy, Problems, and a Solution, 36 Sw. L.J. 743,745-46 & n.17 (1982). 
85 See Weinstein, supra note 6, at 840-41; see also supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
86 E.g., Nettles v. General Accident Fires & Life Assur. Corp., 234 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1956); 
In Re "Agent Orange" Products Liability Litigation, 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N. Y. 1983). 
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reason for bifurcation of liability and damages in Texas City, it was 
several years before the practice became more commonplace. 
Routine bifurcation of liability and damages made a sharp advance 
when, in 1960, the Northern District of Illinois adopted a local rule 
that seemingly created a presumption in favor of bifurcation of lia-
bility and damages in civil cases. 87 The local rule was intended "to 
curtail undue delay in the administration of justice in personal injury 
and other civil litigation."88 Under this rule, the issue of liability 
could be adjudicated as a prerequisite to the determination of any 
and all other issues. It stated that the court was allowed to hear any 
or all issues together "if, in its discretion, and in furtherance of 
justice, it shall appear that a separate trial will work a hardship 
upon any of the parties or will result in protracted or costly litiga-
tion. "89 The fact that an exceptional finding had to be made for the 
court not to bifurcate furthers the implication that efficiency-based 
bifurcation was to be the norm. 
In an attack on the validity of the local rule immediately upon its 
implementation,90 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit held that "the essential character of the trial by jury was 
preserved."91 The court added a significant warning, however, that 
this type of separation should be administered carefully. In some 
cases, the appeals court stated, questions as to the injury will have 
an important bearing on questions of liability. 92 
The Northern District of Illinois rule and similar rules that fol-
lowed it in other jurisdictions made the practice of bifurcating lia-
bility and damages a much more common judicial device in personal 
injury litigation. 93 Two federal districts have stated explicitly that 
bifurcation of liability and damages in tort cases is presumptively 
favored unless a party affirmatively shows why bifurcation would be 
87 Civil Rule 21, Federal District Court, Northern District of Illinois, 2 FED. RULES SERVo 
2d 1048 (1960). 
88 ld. 
891d. 
90 Hosie V. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 282 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 
(1961). 
91 ld. at 643 (citing Gasoline Prod. CO. V. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 497-98 (1931)). 
92 ld. at 643-44. 
93 Other federal district courts have adopted local rules similar to Local Rule 21. See, e.g., 
D. CONN. R. 10(b); W.D. LA. R. 20; N.D.N.Y. R. 40; N.D. OHIO R. 18.01; E.D. TENN. R. 
18.2. States have also adopted provisions similar to Rule 42(b). See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 
42(b); MINN. R. CIV. P. 42.02; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1048 (West 1980). But cf. Hey v. 
Hughes, 158 Tex. 362, 367, 311 S.W.2d 648, 651 (1958). In !ley, the Texas Supreme Court 
held that the issues of liability and damages were inseparable in the personal injury field, 
even though the State had a rule almost identical to Rule 42(b). See TEX. R. CIV. P. 174(b). 
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inappropriate. 94 Most courts, however, continue to make the bifur-
cation decision on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with the stan-
dards contained in Rule 42(b) and embodied in decisions following 
the Gasoline Products test. 95 
C. Problems Identified in the Debate Over Separating Liability 
and Damages 
Since before the passage of the Federal Rules, scholars, judges, 
and practitioners have debated the propriety of routinely separating 
liability issues from thos(} of damages. This debate identified various 
benefits and harms that could result from bifurcating trials along 
these lines. 
Proponents of bifurcation tended to stress its efficiency, the sav-
ings in time and expense for the court and, secondarily, for the 
parties. 96 For example, one pro-bifurcation study showed that a 
94 Southern District of Illinois, Order of Foreman, J., states that cases will be tried "on a 
split trial basis unless good cause can be shown to do otherwise." Eastern District of Tennessee 
Rule 18.2 provides in part that "the parties in diversity litigation will have the burden of 
showing that the liability and damage issues should be tried simultaneously or otherwise the 
liability and damage issues will be tried in sequence." E.D. TENN. R. 18.2. 
The Local Rules Project was authorized by the United States Judicial Conference to conduct 
a study of local rules of civil procedure in all of the federal district courts. Interview with 
Mary P. Squiers, Project Director, Local Rules Project, in Newton, Mass. (Sept. 5, 1989). 
The Local Rules Project Report identified the Southern District of Illinois Order and the 
Eastern District of Tennessee Rule as inconsistent with Rule 42(b) because Rule 42(b) assumes 
a unified trial unless bifurcation furthers convenience or avoids prejudice. LOCAL RULES 
PROJECT REPORT, U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, at 121 (1988). The Local Rules Project 
recommends that these rules be rescinded due to their contradiction of Rule 42(b). Id. at 120. 
See also Moss v. Associated Transport, Inc., 344 F.2d 23, 25 (6th Cir. 1965) ("separation of 
issues should be resorted to only in the exercise of informed discretion and in a case and at a 
juncture which move the court to conclude that such action will really further convenience or 
avoid prejudice"). 
95 See, e.g., H.B. Fuller Co. v. National Starch & Chern. Corp., 595 F. Supp. 622, 625 (D. 
Del. 1984) ("It is true of any case that a separate trial on a dispositive issue might save some 
time and energy; however, that fact has not led to the routine bifurcation of trial for the 
simple reason that judicial economy is not the be all and the end all of the administration of 
justice."); R.E. Linder Steel Erection Corp. v. Wedemeyer, Cernik, Corrubia, Inc., 585 F. 
Supp. 1530, 1534 (D. Md. 1984) ("the court believes that any savings in time and expense 
which might result from a bifurcation is wholly speculative"). 
96 See Mayers, The Severance for Trial of Liability from Damage, 86 U. PENN. L. REV. 
389 (1938); Miner, Court Congestion: A New Approach, 45 A.B.A. J. 1265 (1959); Zeisel & 
Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical Arwlysis, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1606 
(1963); Vogel, The Issues of Liability and Damages in Tort Cases Should Be Separated for 
the Purposes of Trial, ABA INS. NEG. & COMPENSATION SEC. 265 (1960); Schwartz, Sever-
ance-A Means of Minimizing the Role of Burden and Expense in Determining the Outcome 
of Litigation, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1197 (1967); see also Comment, Bifurcation of Liability and 
Damages in Rule 23(bj(3) Class Actions: History, Policy, Problems, and a Solution, 36 Sw. 
L.J. 743, 760-63. 
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twenty percent savings in trial time is possible with routine bifur-
cation because: damages do not have to be tried if a plaintiff fails 
to establish liability; more directed verdicts issue; and settlements 
become more likely after liability is established. 97 Proponents argued 
that simplifying a jury's task by limiting the scope of questions before 
it improved judicial economy. 98 
Proponents believed that bifurcated proceedings were often more 
just than the traditional unified trial. 99 Trials on damages alone, after 
liability has been established, avoid prejudice to defendants by di-
vorcing emotion and passion from the strictly rational question of 
liability. 100 
Opponents' arguments against bifurcation centered around fair-
ness, focusing on the contention that parties, primarily plaintiffs, 
were denied their right to a fair trial due to an alteration in the 
traditional role of the jury.l0l Opponents emphasized the role of the 
jury as a popular institution providing a social conscience, and tem-
pering rigid technicalities of substantive law by "fusing" issues of 
liability and damages. 102 In this view, plaintiffs spread their entire 
case before the jury, organized as they see fit to achieve a common-
sense presentation. The jury must then weigh all the factors before 
it and reach a verdict. 103 
The classic example of jury fusion of issues as part of an evolu-
tionary tort system is jury treatment of contributory negligence 
97 Zeisel & Callahan, supra note 96, at 1624-25. 
98 See Miner, supra note 96, at 1268. Additional reasons for regular bifurcation of liability 
and damages advanced therein include: reduction of the court docket; inducement for defen-
dants found liable to settle; reduction of frivolous claims; and reduction of costs to parties. 
Id.; see also In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974,69 F.R.D. 310, 321 (C.D. Cal. 1975). 
99 See Vogel, supra note 96, at 269; Schwartz, supra note 96, at 1213-14. 
100 Id.; see also McKellar v. Clark Equip. Co., 101 F.R.D. 93, 95 (D. Me. 1984) (liability and 
damages separated to avoid prejudice to defendant from jury exposure to plaintiff's severe 
injuries); Campolongo v. Celotex Corp., 681 F. Supp. 261, 263 (D.N.J. 1988) (punitive damages 
separated because of prejudicial and inflammatory nature of such "conduct-related" proofs). 
101 See Note, Separate Trials of a Claim or Issue in Modern Pleading: Rule 42(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 MINN. L. REV. 743 (1955); Kalven, The Jury, the Law, 
and the Personal Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 158 (1958); Brault, The Issues of Liability 
and Damages in Tort Cases Should Not Be Separated for the Purposes of Trial, ABA INS. 
NEG. & COMPENSATION SEC. 274 (1960); Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence 
Trials: An Example of Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND. L. REV. 831 
(1961); Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status, Causes, and Proposed Remedies, in THE 
COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 29 (H. Jones ed. 1965). 
102 Note, supra note 85, at 761; Kalven, supra note 101, at 165-67; Weinstein, supra note 
101, at 832-35. 
103 See D. LOUISELL & G. HAZARD, CASES ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE, 875-76 (1979); 
Rosenberg, supra note 101, at 47-49. 
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rules. 104 Before comparative fault standards emerged to correct the 
inequities of the strict contributory negligence defense, juries were 
fusing the questions of liability and damages to find defendants liable 
even when a plaintiff was partially at fault. 105 In practice, this meant 
that a jury took a plaintiff's share of the blame into account when 
assessing damages, and simply awarded a suitably lower verdict. 
This system, of course, is what a comparative negligence scheme 
employs. 
Although defendants in personal injury trials traditionally won 
verdicts of no liability forty-two percent of the time, cases tried with 
separate damages and liability proceedings resulted in defendants' 
verdicts seventy-nine percent of the time. This statistical fact dem-
onstrates a "pronounced substantive backlash" from a procedural 
rule. 106 According to the opponents of presumptive bifurcation, it is 
plaintiffs, not defendants, who are unfairly prejudiced by such use 
of Rule 42(b).107 
Some courts expressed concern about possible abuse of the Rule 
and the unfairness that would result. One court of appeals simply 
stated that "[t]he touchstone in reviewing bifurcated proceedings, is 
whether the party bearing the burden of proof was unfairly preju-
diced by the procedures employed. Rule 42(b) permits bifurcation to 
'avoid prejudice,' not to create it."108 
III. BEYOND SIMPLE BIFURCATION: POLYFURCATION OF 
DISCRETE LIABILITY ISSUES 
Courts generally employ Rule 42(b) to make relatively simple 
divisions up to and including separating liability issues from those 
of damages in tort litigation. Virtually all of the commentary to date 
about the Rule concerns this type of bifurcation. The past few years, 
however, have presented the courts, quite unheralded and little 
noted, with a far more complex extension of the separation process 
referred to in this Comment as "polyfurcation." 
Polyfurcation in tort cases is the practice of making multiple sep-
arations within the general question of liability, thereby spawning a 
potentially numerous succession of intra-liability trials before a court 
reaches the damages question, if it ever does at all. Causation is the 
104 See Kalven, supra note 101, at 164-68; Weinstein, supra note 101, at 834--35. 
105 Kalven, supra note 101, at 167. 
106 Rosenberg, supra note 101, at 47-48 (citing Zeisel & Callahan, supra note 96). 
107 See id. at 48. 
108 United States Gypsum Co. v. Schiavo Bros., 668 F.2d 172, 181 (3d Cir. 1981). 
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liability issue most commonly separated for initial tria1. 109 Like cau-
sation, the liability issues that have been polyfurcated are always 
potentially dispositive of tort claims. 110 
Polyfurcation thus invites an even more dramatically pitched con-
troversy between the goals of efficiency and fairness, because it 
opens litigation to the possibility of judicially approved "divide and 
conquer" divisions within the heart of the litigation. As to efficiency, 
polyfurcation might allow a narrow but dispositive issue to be blown 
out of proportion if split off for individual trial, when it would likely 
absorb only a tiny fraction of a full trial's time. 111 As to unfairness, 
polyfurcation might so truncate each step of a plaintiff's proofs as 
to make it incoherent to a trier of fact. 112 
The first tort case to order such polyfurcation was In re Beverly 
Hills Fire Litigation,113 an action brought against manufacturers 
and installers of aluminum wiring alleged to have caused a fire in a 
crowded supper club. The fire took the lives of 165 patrons and 
employees and injured many others. 114 The trial judge ordered three 
separate trials: a cause-in-fact determination; a determination of 
whether cooperative or concerted activities by defendants violated 
a legal standard of care; and finally, if the plaintiffs prevailed in the 
first two trials, a trial on damages. 115 The jury concluded in the first 
trial that the connection of the suspect aluminum wire to an electrical 
device did not cause the fire. 116 Thus, the defendant prevailed. 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals approved the issue polyfur-
cation, but reversed the lower court on other grounds.117 The court 
was not persuaded by the plaintiffs' argument that no caselaw sup-
109 See, e.g., In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1982), cen. denied, 
461 U.S. 929 (1983) (cause-in-fact of restaurant fire separated); In re Richardson-Merrill, Inc. 
"Bendectin" Products Liability Litigation, 624 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (general cau-
sation separated). 
110 See, e.g., id. 
11l See infra notes 270-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the impact of the "all-
or-nothing" approach attorneys must take when faced with a narrow but potentially dispositive 
issue. 
112 See infra notes 228-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of Anderson v. W.R. 
Grace, 628 F.Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986), where a polyfurcated trial ended with judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict because of jury confusion. 
113 695 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1982), cen. denied, 461 U.S. 929 (1983). 
114Id. at 210. 
115Id. 
116 Id. at 211. 
117 Id. at 217-18. A juror had conducted an improper experiment at home that tended to 
contradict plaintiffs' evidence as to the hazards of aluminum wiring, and informed his fellow 
jurors of these results. Id. at 211. 
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ported the judge's authority to bifurcate the issue of causation. It 
also rejected the plaintiffs' contention that courts had gone no further 
than to separate issues of liability from issues of damages. 118 Rather, 
simply citing the broad language of Rule 42(b), which states that 
"any separate issue"119 may be bifurcated, the court held that there 
was no reason to adopt a different standard with regard to causa-
tion. 120 According to the appellate court, the time and expense po-
tentially saved by disposition of the causation issue were reasonable 
grounds for the district court's polyfurcation order.121 
The court of appeals recognized the strong argument made by the 
plaintiffs against a trial limited to causation, however, and proceeded 
to limit its holding to the particular circumstances of the case. 122 The 
plaintiffs' argument was outlined by the court of appeals as follows: 
There is a danger that bifurcation may deprive plaintiffs of their 
legitimate right to place before the jury the circumstances and 
atmosphere of the entire cause of action which they have brought 
into the court, replacing it with a sterile or laboratory atmo-
sphere in which causation is parted from the reality of the in-jury. 123 
The court suggested that apprehension of such effects on a jury 
might well cause courts to reject bifurcation of the causation issue 
in less complex cases. 
As further justification for the lower court's decision, the circuit 
court characterized the fire as a major disaster generally known to 
the jurors through media coverage. 124 The court held that when 
combined with the limited evidence presented at the trial, this gen-
eral knowledge adequately apprised the jury of the general circum-
U8 [d. at 216. The court of appeals cited Beeck v. Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 562 F.2d 537, 
542 (8th Cir. 1977), as approving bifurcation of causation. The separate trial in Beeck, a 
product liability case, determined whether the defendant had in fact manufactured the pool-
slide at issue. Significantly, therefore, the only case the court cited for support of separating 
the causation issue did not actually involve such a use of bifurcation. Rather, it demonstrated 
a use much closer to simple, traditional uses such as determining validity of a patent in an 
infringement case. See, e.g., Woburn Degreasing Co. of New Jersey v. Spencer Kellogg & 
Sons, 37 F. Supp. 311 (1941). 
U9 See supra note 18 for the text of Rule 42(b). 
120 In re Beverly Hills, 695 F.2d at 216. 
121 [d. at 217-18. But cf. Baker v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 11 F.R.D. 440, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 
1951) ("A paramount consideration at all times in the administration of justice is a fair and 
impartial trial to all litigants. Considerations of economy of time, money and convenience ... 
must yield thereto. "). 
122 695 F.2d at 217. 
123 [d. 
124 [d. 
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stances in which the fire arose. 125 On remand, the trial judge had 
discretion to polyfurcate the case in the same manner. 
Several federal courts have followed the Beverly Hills precedent 
in environmental tort cases, raising the possibility of a renewed and 
even more dramatic debate about the contending values of efficiency 
and fairness noted by the Sixth Circuit. These environmental tort 
trials have employed the polyfurcation device to separate out various 
causation issues for determination prior to other liability and dam-
ages issues. 126 
The first major environmental litigation after Beverly Hills to 
invoke liability-issue polyfurcation was the massive Agent Orange 
litigation in the Eastern District of New York. 127 Hundreds of Viet-
nam War veterans and their families brought this action against both 
the manufacturers of the defoliant known as Agent Orange and the 
United States government, which used it in Vietnam. 128 Chief Judge 
Jack B. Weinstein129 certified two plaintiff classes, and ordered a 
separate trial on general causation to determine whether the various 
injuries suffered by plaintiffs could have been caused by Agent 
Orange. 130 
The causation trial was to be a "test case" with representative 
claimants for each type of injury alleged. 131 A negative causality 
finding on any injury type would end all claims based on that injury, 
just as a finding of a causal relationship between Agent Orange and 
an injury type would resolve the general causation issue for all of 
those claims in favor of the plaintiffs. 132 
The court noted that a total or partial determination that plaintiffs 
could not prove causation would save considerable time for the court 
125Id. 
126 These three cases, while noted here, are discussed further in Section IV, infra. 
127 In re "Agent Orange" Products Liability Litigation, 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N. Y. 1983). 
The Agent Orange class action was brought by more than 15,000 named individuals, mostly 
Vietnam veterans and their families, who claimed to be directly or indirectly injured by 
military spraying of the herbicide Agent Orange during the war. Seven out of an original 24 
corporate entities and the United States government were defendants to the action. P. 
SCHUCKE, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL 4-5 (1986). 
128 In re Diamond Shamrock Chern. Co., 725 F.2d 858, 859 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 
1067 (1984). 
129 Judge Weinstein took over the Agent Orange case in 1983 when Judge Pratt, who had 
presided over the case since 1979, was elevated to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. P. 
SCHUCKE, supra note 127, at 110-11. It is interesting to note that, as a law school professor, 
Judge Weinstein wrote one of the articles attacking the routine bifurcation of liability and 
damages. See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text. 
130 Agent Orange, 100 F.R.D. at 724. 
131Id. at 723. 
132Id. 
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and the parties. 133 Any positive causality determination would re-
quire further trials of the defendants' liability and possible affirma-
tive defenses. If plaintiffs were also successful in these class trials, 
individual trials for specific causation and damages would follow, 
either in the Eastern District of N ew York or in the jurisdiction of 
origin for the individual plaintiffs' claims. 134 
Defendants contested the class certification and argued that a 
general causation trial followed by further trials, possibly before 
other juries, would violate their right to have a single jury rule on 
their liability to each individual plaintiff.135 In denying defendants' 
objections, the court stated that "tacit admissions" that a defendant's 
product could have caused a plaintiff's injuries were commonplace 
in product liability suits. The question remaining for the subsequent 
jury or juries would be whether the product actually did cause the 
specific injury. 136 
The defendants petitioned for a writ of mandamus to the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit to compel the lower court to vacate 
the class certification. 137 They argued, in part, that the issue of 
general cause, identified as a common issue for the class certification, 
was insignificant, and therefore, was not a proper basis for certifi-
cation. 138 The Second Circuit declined to issue the writ, thereby 
upholding the class certification. 139 Shortly after this appeal failed, 
and as jury selection was about to begin, the parties agreed to a 
settlement. 140 While admitting to no liability, the defendant manu-
facturers agreed to pay to the plaintiff class $180 million. 141 
In re Richardson-Merrell "Bendectin" Products Liability 
Litigation142 presents another example of a case in which the court 
separated the general causation issue from other liability issues. The 
Bendectin case consolidated approximately 1200 actions, from dif-
133Id. 
134 Id. at 724; see also Agent Orange, 565 F. Supp. 1263, 1275-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (order 
by Judge Pratt scheduling a class-wide trial on the issues of defendants' liability, general 
causation, and the governmental contractor defense). 
135 Agent Orange, 100 F.R.D. at 724. 
136 I d. The court expressed its faith in juries' ability to separate a tacit belief that a product 
could cause harm from its consideration of whether the product actually inflicted a plaintiff's 
injury. 
137 In re Diamond Shamrock Chern. Co., 725 F.2d 858, 859-61 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 465 
U.S. 1067 (1984). 
138Id. at 860. 
139Id. at 860-61. 
140 See In re "Agent Orange" Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 381, at 13-14 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1984) (preliminary memorandum and order on settlement). 
141Id. at 14. 
142 624 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985). 
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ferent districts, brought by persons alleging birth defects as a result 
of ingestion of Bendectin, an anti-nausea drug, during pregnancy. 143 
The district judge coordinating this multi-district litigation or-
dered a polyfurcated trial structure in which the general causation 
issue was to be tried first for all plaintiffs, to be followed by a trial 
on the other common liability issues, if necessary. 144 Specific causa-
tion and damages issues were to be heard in the districts of origin 
if the plaintiffs prevailed in the first two trials. 145 The Bendectin 
plaintiffs opposed this polyfurcation, relying in part on the language 
in Beverly Hills 146 warning against divorcing causation from the 
reality of the injury. 147 
A twenty-two day trial took place solely on the issue of general 
causation over the plaintiffs' objections to such a trial structure. At 
trial, the parties presented strictly scientific and technical evidence, 
and took testimony solely from nineteen expert witnesses. 148 When 
the presentation of evidence was complete, the court presented a 
single question to the jury: does Bendectin cause birth defects?149 
After less than one day's deliberation, the jury answered the ques-
tion in the negative, and returned a verdict for the defendant. 150 
In justifying its polyfurcation decision, the court referred to Rule 
42(b),151 noting that, on a national scale, the Bendectin litigation had 
143 The plaintiffs in Bendectin alleged that 18 million American women and 14 million more 
outside this country took the drug until Merrell ceased its production for "compelling non-
medical reasons." Kaufman & Lauter, Bendectin Verdict Doesn't End Suits, 74 Nat'l L.J., 
Mar. 25, 1985, at 3, col. 2. There were hundreds more Bendectin-related cases pending at the 
time of this trial. 
144 624 F. Supp. 1212 app. at 1249-50. 
145 I d. at 1250. 
146 695 F.2d at 207, 217 (6th Cir. 1982); see also supra notes 113-25 and accompanying text. 
147 624 F. Supp. at 1221-22. 
14Bf d. at 1218. 
149 Id. at 1222. The question presented to the jury was: 
Have the plaintiffs established by a preponderance of the evidence that ingestion of 
Bendectin at therapeutic doses during the period of fetal organogenesis is a proximate 
cause of human birth defects? 
624 F. Supp. 1212 app. at 1268. If the jury answered "No," then they were to enter a verdict 
for defendants. If it answered "Yes" to the above question, they were to determine which 
defects Bendectin caused from a list provided to them. Id. 
150Id. at 1218. Not all Bendectin suits had the same outcome. In Oxendine v. Merrell-Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, 506 A.2d 1100 (D.C. 1986), the verdict for a single plaintiff in the amount 
of $750,000 was reinstated by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which reversed the 
trial court's judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the defendant. The jury found 
that Bendectin was a teratogen, caused birth defects, and caused the injuries the plaintiff 
suffered. This unified, single-phase trial took place before the consolidated trial in the Southern 
District of Ohio, although the Oxendine appeals decision came out after the above case was 
decided. 
151 624 F. Supp. at 1221. 
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the potential for immobilizing the entire federal judiciary.152 The 
opinion also referred to concerns about judicial economy and poten-
tial delays that plaintiffs would have encountered if any other pro-
cedure had been employed. 153 
The court recognized and agreed with the Beverly Hills 154 dicta 
to the effect that polyfurcation had the potential to damage a plain-
tiff's case by isolating sterile factual questions from a plaintiff's very 
real situation. 155 In response to this concern, the court instructed 
the jurors at the beginning of the trial that, even though the evidence 
presented would be technical, the case was significant to many peo-
ple, and that they should consider how the evidence related to people 
on both sides. 156 
N ext, the court considered the effect of excluding all plaintiffs 
from the courtroom who were under ten years of age and those 
above that age with visible defects. 157 'The court highlighted a theme 
in the plaintiffs' arguments that the presence of the crippled children 
would enable the jury to render a more fair and impartial verdict. 
To the court, however, it seemed beyond argument that the presence 
of deformed children at the causation trial might confuse the issue 
or mislead the jury.158 Noting that excluding the children from the 
courtroom during the damages phase of the trial would indeed violate 
plaintiffs' due process rights, the court held that the probative value 
of their presence during the causation trial was nonexistent while 
the prejudice to defendant was beyond calculation. 159 
152Id. 
153 I d. The court also cites to cases in its circuit that upheld bifurcation decisions, including: 
Helminski v. Ayerst Laboratories, 766 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1985); In re Beverly Hills Fire 
Litigation, 695 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929 (1983); Koster v. 7-Up Co., 
595 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1978); Moss v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1965). 
154 695 F.2d at 217. 
155 624 F.2d at 1222. 
156 Id. The court instructed the jury: 
Id. 
The evidence in this case will indicate that this is a consolidated case; that is, the 
plaintiffs represent some hundreds of other plaintiffs .... Let me suggest to you 
that what you are about to do may be one of the most important things you will ever 
do in your entire life. This is a significant case .... It involves not only the plaintiffs, 
who are individuals; it involves people, scientists, people who have done experiments, 
people who are employees of the defendant company. The totality of this case involves 
people and while you will hear technical evidence I do point out to you that at all 
times you should keep in mind that on both sides there are people involved. 
157 I d. at 1222-24. 
158Id. at 1222-23 (the court drew a parallel to Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
which provides in part: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury .... "). 
159 I d. at 1223-24. In making this decision, the court employed a test established in Helminski 
1989] POLYFURCATION 145 
The plaintiffs appealed many of the trial court's evidentiary and 
trial structure rulings to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 160 The 
court of appeals stated that the propriety of the polyfurcation ruling 
\-vas the most troubling issue presented to it on appeal. 161 With no 
precise guidelines for reviewing Rule 42(b) rulings and only abuse 
of discretion as a basis for review, the circuit court upheld the lower 
court's polyfurcation order162 and its various evidentiary holdings. 163 
The appeals court also approved the exclusion of the children from 
the courtroom. 164 
Anderson v. W.R. Grace & CO.165 is a third environmental case 
thafCons~ the propr-iety of separating causation questions from 
other liability issues for the purpose of conducting separate trials. 
Members of a neighborhood, who suffered from leukemia, brought 
this action against W.R. Grace & Company and Beatrice Corporation 
claiming that the defendant companies caused their illnesses by pol-
luting the municipal wells serving their homes. 166 
Just before the case went to trial, after four years of thorough 
discovery on all issues in the case, the defense moved to have a 
series of mini-liability trials pursuant to Rule 42(b).167 The plaintiffs 
objected strenuously, arguing that the party bearing the burden of 
proof customarily had the right to determine the sequence of factual 
issues presented at trial.168 Additionally, Rule 42(b) bifurcation re-
v. Ayerst Laboratories, 766 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1985). According to the Helminski test, a court 
first must determine whether a party's mere presence would be so prejudicial that the jury 
could not perform its duty. Id. at 218. It is not enough that the party has some physical or 
mental injury. Upon finding the party's presence prejudicial, the court must consider whether 
the party can understand the current proceedings and potentially aid counsel. The party's 
ability to "comprehend the proceedings and assist counsel in any meaningful way" requires 
that he or she be allowed in the courtroom regardless of possible prejudice to the other side. 
Id. 
160 In re Bendectin Litigation, 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 788 
(1989). 
161 Id. at 307. 
162 Id. at 320. The court used a three-part analysis to review the polyfurcation decision, 
which was the same used for bifurcation decisions: first, the court determined that causation 
was a separate issue; second, it found that causation could be heard alone without undue 
prejudice; and third, the court determined that polyfurcation was conducive to judicial econ-
omy.Id. 
163 Id. at 320-22. 
164 Id. at 322-25. 
165 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986). 
166 What the plaintiffs discovered can be described as a "leukemia cluster," a residential 
area determined to have a seven-and-a-half times greater incidence of leukemia than normally 
expected. Pacelle, Contaminated Verdict, Am. Law., Dec. 1986, at 77, col. 1 (article chronicles 
the deliberations of the jurors based on interviews after the trial). 
167Id. at 77, col. 1. 
168 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffa' Trial Plan, at 1 & n.3, Anderson v. Cryovac (D. 
Mass.) (No. 82-1672-S) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Memorandum]. 
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mained the exception rather than the rule, and the plaintiffs con-
tended that the defendants' plan would serve Rule 42(b)'s goals of 
efficiency and avoidance of confusion only if the defendants won in 
the first phase. 169 Finally, the plaintiffs themselves made a counter-
proposal that, if the court wished to serve efficiency by bifurcating, 
the compensatory and punitive damages questions should be sepa-
rated for trial subsequent to a unified liability presentation and 
determination. 170 
Granting the defendants' motion, the court ordered a polyfurcated 
trial in four phases. 171 The first trial would determine legal respon-
sibility for exposure, that is, whether the defendants' toxic solvents 
had reached plaintiffs' water supply. Legal exposure in the Anderson 
case necessitated findings that the defendants dumped chemicals on 
their own property, that the chemicals actually migrated from the 
defendants' property to the municipal wells, and that these events 
occurred at a time when the defendants were legally liable in tort. 172 
Although the defendants' solvents might previously have reached 
the plaintiffs, only proof that the solvents reached the plaintiffs 
between certain dates could be used as a basis for liability. 173 
If the plaintiffs proved that one or both of the defendants' solvents 
reached the wells inside the 'period of liability, the second trial would 
decide whether the chemicals caused the plaintiffs' leukemias. The 
third trial would take up causation of the array of alleged health 
claims other than leukemia. 174 The fourth trial would assess compen-
satory and punitive damages. 175 
Having prepared for a full, unified trial, the plaintiffs reorganized 
their proofs and arguments to address the narrowed initial question, 
which took four months to try. 176 Within the already limited question 
of legal exposure, the judge ultimately decided to submit to the jury 
169 [d. at 2--3. Plaintiffs cite several cases for the proposition that proposed time savings 
must be very likely for bifurcation to be ordered. See, e.g., R.E. Linder Steel Erection Co. 
v. Wedemeyer, Cernik, Corrubia, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 1530, 1534 (D. Md. 1984) ("the court 
believes that any savings in time and expense which might result from bifurcation is wholly 
speculative"; motion denied); Organic Chern., Inc. v. Carroll Prod., Inc., 86 F.R.D. 468, 471 
(W.D. Mich. 1980) ("it is very likely that there will be an overlapping of evidence"; motion 
denied). 
170 Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 168, at 5. 
171 Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910, 914 (1st Cir. 1988); see also Pacelle, supra note 
166, at 77, col. 2. 
172 862 F.2d at 914. 
173 [d. 
174 See id.; see also Pacelle, supra note 166, at 77, col. 2. 
175 See Pacelle, supra note 166, at 77, col. 2. 
176 862 F.2d at !!14. 
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four further-narrowed interrogatories as to each defendant. 177 The 
jury returned a verdict of no liability for the defendant Beatrice 
Corporation and a self-contradictory verdict of negligence against 
W.R. Grace for contamination of the wells. 178 Based on the jury's 
confused verdict against Grace, the court ordered a new trial with 
regard to that defendant. 179 
The Agent Orange Litigation, the Bendectin Litigation, and An-
derson v. W.R. Grace provide examples for an analysis of the pro-
priety of splitting off discrete intra-liability issues for separate trial 
in environmental tort cases. Both the Agent Orange Litigation and 
the Bendectin Litigation involved separation of general causation 
issues. 18o The Anderson case had multiple splits even within the 
causation issue: the first issue was a narrow causation issue regard-
ing proof of responsibility for the pollution in question; the second 
and third were injury etiology questions; and the last was the ques-
tion of damages. 181 
Both plaintiffs and defendants in these environmental tort cases 
raised various issues on the fairness of polyfurcation. Some of the 
arguments parallel those made in the previous controversy over 
simpler forms of bifurcation, but polyfurcation adds new quantitative 
and qualitative problems that deserve recognition in their own right 
as a novel legal conundrum. 
IV. BALANCING COMPETING VALVES IN THE NEW ERA OF 
POLYFVRCATION 
A. A Functional Analysis 
To understand the problematic nature of polyfurcation, it is helpful 
to analyze the impact that bifurcated and polyfurcated trial struc-
tures have had on the conduct of past cases. 
1. Understanding the Roots of Polyfurcation 
As pressures of efficiency and economy of judicial resources 
mounted over time, courts expanded their conceptions of properly 
177 See the Appendix to this Comment for full the text of the special interrogatories regarding 
defendant W.R. Grace. 
178 862 F.2d at 914-15; see also Pacelle, supra note 166, at 79-80. 
179 Pacelle, supra note 166, at 80, col. 3. 
180 See supra notes 127-164 and accompanying text. 
181 See supra notes 168-79 and accompanying text. 
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separable claims, defenses, and issues. 182 Courts have moved beyond 
the once-extreme separation of liability and damages, and have made 
intra-liability divisions. Beeck v. Aquaslide-N-Dive COrp.183 offers a 
perfect example of a separated issue that was completely indepen-
dent of any other issue. The trial court in Beeck separated the 
discrete issue of whether the defendant had manufactured the swim-
ming pool slide involved in an accident. 184 Upon a positive finding by 
the jury on that question, a further trial of the remaining issues of 
the products liability claim would have been tried. 
The factual question of who manufactured the slide did not depend 
upon any other issue in this case, and was ascertainable upon very 
limited proofs. To decide the manufacture issue, the jury did not 
have to address whether the product was defective or if any defect 
was the proximate cause of the accident. Liability ultimately de-
pended upon the defendant's construction of the slide, but the issues 
of causation and defect were completely distinct from whether the 
defendant had manufactured it. 
The jury in Beeck found that the defendant had not manufactured 
the slide, ending the case at that stage. 185 The procedures employed 
in arriving at that early decision, however, did not prejudice the 
plaintiffs in any way. This trial structure clearly served economy of 
the court's and the parties' time because the limited trial on the 
manufacture issue was very short. 186 Separation also spared the 
defendant from possible prejudice by jury sympathy for plaintiffs' 
severe injuries. A unified trial would have necessitated such damages 
evidence, which could have obscured the independent determination 
of who manufactured the slide. 187 
In In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation,188 the true origin of poly-
furcation, the court obviously thought it was separating a Beec~­
type question when it ordered an initial trial on the causation in fact 
of the supper club fire. 189 The causation issues in Beverly Hills were 
182 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
183 562 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1977). 
184 Id. at 541. 
185 I d. at 542. 
186Id. 
187 Unfortunately, the statute of limitations had run out for plaintiffs' claim so that they 
could not sue the actual manufacturer. 526 F.2d at 539. Generally, however, a quick deter-
mination like that made in Beeck would allow a plaintiff to seek out the responsible party 
before tolling of the statute of limitations. 
188 695 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929 (1983). 
189 See id. at 216. The Beverly Hills court cited the Beeck separation as precedent for 
hearing causation before other liability issues. This reliance on Beeck is questionable. Sepa-
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more bound up with the merits than the manufacture issue in Beeck, 
but the issues that the court separated in Beverly Hills still met the 
distinct and separable test. 
The plaintiffs in Beverly Hills alleged three theories of liability, 
but the judge ordered that only a concerted action theory could be 
used to find liability.190 When the trial judge gave this order, he 
determined three elements that the plaintiffs had to prove in order 
to prevail: a causal relationship between the use of the aluminum 
wire and the fire; cooperation or concerted activities by the defen-
dants; and violation by such actions of a legal standard of care owed 
to the plaintiffs.191 The first element, causation in fact, was the 
subject of the initial trial under the judge's polyfurcation order.192 
In this initial trial, the jury had to determine both the general 
causation question-whether aluminum wire had the propensity to 
cause fires-and the specific causation question-whether the alu-
minum wiring at the supper club had in fact started the fire. 193 These 
two questions formed a separately triable unit because they did not 
have any bearing on the other liability issues identified. By combin-
ing the general and specific questions of causation, the Beverly Hills 
court assured that the full circumstances of the plaintiffs' causation 
argument were before the jury. 
The nature of the causation issue presented in Beverly Hills was 
also suited to separate jury consideration. Laypersons can be as-
sumed to have at least a general knowledge of how electrical recep-
tacles are wired, and, more importantly, an understanding of the 
relationship between electrical current and how heat might build up 
at connections. Indeed, the problem in Beverly Hills was complex 
because of the extent of fire damage and the resulting uncertainties 
about the starting point of the fire. 194 The issues themselves, how-
ever, were not foreign to everyday experience. 
The jury did not need to make a leap of faith to find for the plaintiff 
on the causation issue. Either the jury would believe that the alu-
minum wires were faulty and sparked the fire, or it would believe 
rating the manufacture issue is more analagous to separating the questions of whether a 
patent existed in an infringement case than it is to separating causation itself in a tort case. 
Courts have separated clearly independent but dispositive issues like the patent question for 
many years. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text. 
190 695 F.2d at 210 n.!. Concerted activity can be proved in Kentucky either by explicit or 
tacit agreement among defendants. Id. 
191Id. 
192Id. at 210; see also supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. 
193 695 F.2d at 21O-1!' 
194 Id. at 220 & n.23. 
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one of the alternative causes proposed by the defendants, such as 
one of the various code violations alleged to exist at the time of the 
fire. 195 In the end, the jury accepted an alternative argument, and 
found for the defendants. 
Although the break between causation and the rest of the claim 
was not as clean as the separation of the manufacture issue in Beeck, 
the Beverly Hills polyfurcation rightfully survived examination by 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 196 Using the language of Rule 
42(b) and various precedents, the court balanced the interests of the 
court and the parties in upholding the decision. 197 
2. ANew Balance in an Old Framework 
In re Bendectin Products Liability Litigation198 involved allega-
tions that the morning sickness drug Bendectin was teratogenic, 
that is, that it caused birth defects in children born to mothers who 
used it. Anderson v. W.R. Grace199 concerned exposure to toxic 
solvents through pollution of the plaintiffs' drinking water supply, 
and the leukemias allegedly resulting from that exposure. In re 
Agent Orange Products Liability Litigation200 was a sprawling class 
action about the possible carcinogenic and other effects of a potent 
herbicide upon Vietnam veterans who were exposed to it, and the 
alleged teratogenic effect the exposure had on the veterans' children. 
Although Beeck and Beverly Hills raised traditional questions of 
liability under common accidents, Bendectin, Anderson, and Agent 
Orange involved intricate, novel, and hard-to-grasp issues of liability 
for toxic exposure, which cannot be described as traditional. 
Polyfurcation of causation issues in Bendectin, Anderson, and 
Agent Orange represents a distinct qualitative jump from the issues 
separated in prior cases. Quantitatively, too, these environmental 
cases involved divisions that went well beyond separating liability 
and damages, and go even further than the polyfurcation in Beverly 
Hills. For example, in Bendectin the only issue before the jury was 
the generic question of whether the drug causes birth defects, not 
whether it caused the particular plaintiffs' birth defects. 
195 I d. at 220-21. 
196 Id. at 216-17. 
197Id. 
198 624 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985). 
199 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986). 
200 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). 
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Environmental litigation most often involves novel causation is-
sues, over which experts disagree. 201 This uncertainty makes it much 
more difficult for lay jurors who are faced with deciding technical 
issues solely on the basis of what the parties present at trial. Given 
the difficult nature of environmental causation issues, it is no sur-
prise that causation is regarded as the most troublesome problem 
facing the environmental plaintiff today. Both courts and commen-
tators have proposed various reforms to account for the difficulties 
associated with proving a link between exposure to toxics and ill-
nesses such as cancer, given the low level of certainty that medical 
science can offu. 202 
Because causation is often more tenuous in the environmental field 
than in more routine personal injury or products liability cases, it is 
particularly important that procedures employed by the courts hear-
ing these claims do not unduly prejudice parties to environmental 
litigation. In answering the question of whether individual issues of 
causation in environmental litigation are separate and distinct 
enough to be heard alone, judges must take the problematic nature 
of such issues into account to ensure fairness. 203 Unfortunately, anal-
ysis of the environmental cases utilizing polyfurcation shows that 
this factor has been ignored to the detriment of parties on both sides. 
The Bendectin litigation offers a clear example of how polyfurca-
tion of liability issues in environmental tort cases can prejudice 
plaintiffs in violation of Rule 42(b) and the Gasoline Products test. 
A functional analysis like that conducted for Beeck and Beverly Hills 
in the preceding section illuminates the difficulties presented to 
plaintiffs who attempt to litigate their claims within a polyfurcated 
201 In the Bendectin litigation, for example, out of the 19 expert witnesses testifying, 10 
supported the plaintiff's argument that Bendectin was teratogenic and 9 supported the de-
fendant's claim that it was not. See 624 F. Supp. at 1218. 
202 See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 411-15 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, 
816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987) (trial court used a "substantial factor" analysis in place of the 
traditional "but for" test to find against the government in a case involving leukemia victims 
who alleged that their illnesses were caused by above-ground nuclear tests); Delgado, Beyond 
Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-In-Fact Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REV. 
881 (1982); Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific Uncertainty 
in Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469 (1988); Gold, Causation In 
Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE 
L.J. 376 (1986). 
203 In an age when an estimated 40 percent of all cancer deaths in the United States result 
from chemicals in the environment, effective incorporation of environmental claims into the 
tort system must be taken seriously. See Brennan & Carter, Legal and Scientific Probability 
of Causation of Cancer and Other Environmental Diseases in Individuals, 10 J. HEALTH, 
POL., POL'y, AND LAW 33,34 n.12 (1985). 
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trial structure. The problems faced by the jury in deciding these 
polyfurcated cases also become clear. 
Limited to the general causation issue in the first trial, the Ben-
dec tin plaintiffs had to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that Bendectin caused birth defects. 204 If Bendectin was a teratogen, 
it was a "low-grade" variety, meaning either that it caused birth 
defects in a small percentage of infants whose mothers took the drug 
during pregnancy or that the resulting defects were less severe. 205 
The infamous sedative thalidomide was a "high-grade" teratogen, 
which caused severe defects twenty percent of the time. Any effects 
of Bendectin, however, would occur in significantly fewer cases. 206 
Teratologists suggest that, for several reasons, low-grade teratogens 
may be even more dangerous than high-grade teratogens in the long 
run. 207 
The elusive nature of causation issues when dealing with a possible 
low-grade teratogen makes the individual experiences of a given 
plaintiff indispensible to a fair determination. In their motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial, the Ben-
dectin plaintiffs characterized the jury's verdict as advisory.208 They 
reasoned that the jury based its verdict solely on hypothetical facts 
not connected to the plaintiffs' particular situation, and therefore 
that the verdict did not result from a true case or controversy. The 
plaintiffs argued that the judge exceeded his authority under Rule 
42(b), making the verdict a legal nullity.209 Another asserted error 
was the exclusion of crippled minor plaintiffs from the courtroom 
during the polyfurcated initial causation trial. 2lO Polyfurcation and 
204 See supra notes 142--50 and accompanying text. 
205 Bleakey & Peters, Bendectin, TRIAL, May 1980, at 59. 
206 [d. Thalidomide was banned in 1961 after the results of its use during pregnancy were 
discovered. The high frequency and unique nature of defects encountered made the causal 
link relatively obvious. [d. 
207 [d. The effects of low-grade teratogens are harder to detect, harder to prove teratogenic 
given the background rate of defects, harder to distinguish when multiple drugs were ingested 
during pregnancy, and, because of these factors, harder to have removed from the market. 
Bendectin was on the market for approximately 30 years before Merrell-Dow Pharmaceu-
ticals voluntarily stopped manufacturing it. Thalidomide was only on the market a short time 
before it was forced off. [d. Millions more women took Bendectin over those 30 years than 
could have possibly used Thalidomide during its short time of availability. Bendectin was the 
only prescription drug ever to be prescribed specifically for pregnant women, and its apparent 
safety allowed doctors to continue to prescribe it. This drug provides an example of how a 
low-grade teratogen can become more dangerous and insidious than a more obvious high-
grade teratogen. [d. at 56. 
20R 624 F. Supp. at 1222. 
209 [d. 
210 [d. In a National Law Journal article after the trial, one of the plaintiffs' attorneys said 
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the exclusionary rulings, plaintiffs' argument continued, created a 
sterile laboratory environment where causation was parted from the 
reality of plaintiffs' injuries.211 
In its order denying plaintiffs' motions, the trial court disposed of 
the plaintiffs' assertion that the verdict was a nullity in one short 
paragraph. The court held that the sole issue put to the jury was 
appropriate, and that Rule 42(b) allowed for its separation. 212 Rea-
soning that if the plaintiffs failed to prove the essential causation 
element that ingestion of Bendectin caused birth defects, the court 
stated that "it matters not what else they might establish. "213 
The Bendec~in court cited both Beeck and Beverly Hills as prec-
edent for its polyfurcation decision. 214 Neither of those cases, how-
ever, could support separation of the general causation issue for 
individual trial. Beeck's separation of the manufacture issue did not 
divide the substantive merits of the plaintiff's claims. 215 Beverly 
Hills combined the general and specific causation issues.216 Without 
acknowledging that it did so, the Bendectin court extended Rule 
42(b) further than any other court. 
Plaintiffs' contentions about the negative impact of the trial's po-
lyfurcated structure, on the other hand, find support in the record 
of this case. Exclusionary evidentiary rulings further limited the 
already narrow scope of the initial causation trial. Although there 
was some dispute as to whether plaintiffs were allowed to present 
any evidence about particular plaintiffs' experiences,217 the trial cer-
tainly did not focus on the particular causation of any plaintiff's birth 
defects. The judge allowed no evidence on dosages or possible syn-
ergistic effects of other drugs taken, and he instructed the jury to 
assume that prescribed doses were taken. 218 These elements of spe-
cific causation were too interwoven with general causation to be 
heard separately. 
that the judge's procedural rulings on bifurcation and exclusion of plaintiffs had deprived the 
plaintiffs of a "full and fair adjudication of their rights." Kaufman & Lauter, supra note 143, 
at 22, col. l. 
211 624 F. Supp. at 122l. 
212 I d. at 1222. 
213Id. 
214Id. 
215 See supra notes 183-87 and accompanying text. 
216 See supra notes 188-97 and accompanying text. 
217 In re Bendectin Litigation, 857 F.2d 290, 317 (6th Cir. 1988). The court of appeals notes 
some confusion on this point, but holds that plaintiffs were allowed to present individual case 
history testimony through one expert. The expert witness, however, did not offer any such 
evidence. Id. 
218 624 F. Supp. at 1228-29. 
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Various other pieces of evidence that could have affected the jury's 
deliberations were deemed outside the scope of the general causation 
trial. Plaintiffs were not permitted to introduce any evidence about 
alleged conflicts of interest or fraud in the preparation of the Ben-
dectin studies relied upon by the defendant. 219 In its review of the 
judgment, the court of appeals stated that this restriction was prob-
ably the most serious consequence of the polyfurcation order.220 The 
appeals court upheld the lower court's order to allow only attacks 
on the methodology used in the studies in the first trial, however, 
because that order did not amount to an abuse of discretion. 221 
A unified trial of all liability issues would have incorporated all 
questions about the defendants' studies simultaneously. As it was, 
the jury took the various studies at face value. Its decision may well 
have been different with evidence that the defendant's studies were 
not purely scientific or impartially conducted. 
The trial court also excluded all references to thalidomide based 
on the possible prejudice to defendants by jury association of thalid-
omide to the defendant who did not manufacture that drug. 222 De-
fendant Merrell-Dow Pharmeceuticals had tested thalidomide, how-
ever, and the plaintiffs intended to show that the defendant's testing 
failed to detect the very powerful teratogenic effects of thalidomide 
so that the jury could appreciate the possibility of error in Bendectin 
testing. 223 This evidence would have provided the jury with some 
context for assessing the studies proffered by the defendant. Its 
absence thus handicapped the jury. 
On a broad scale, the jury did not have enough of the entire picture 
to make an informed and just decision on the plaintiffs' claims. The 
elements excluded from the plaintiffs' proofs were too interwoven 
with the narrow question actually presented to the jury. Exclusion 
of all plaintiffs under the age of ten and those above that age with 
visible defects further served to isolate the reality of the plaintiffs' 
situation. The plaintiffs were also prohibited from showing any pho-
tographs to illustrate the nature of the defects allegedly caused by 
Bendectin. 224 In fact, the jury only saw plaintiffs without visible 
219 857 F.2d at 317-19. 
22°Id. at 317-18. 
221Id. at 318. 
222Id. at 321-22. 
223 Id. 
224Id. at 323. 
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injuries in the courtroom, which could have hurt the credibility of 
plaintiffs' claims. 225 
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit refused to utilize two alternative 
causation theories to alter the burden of proof in plaintiffs' favor. It 
found that linking ingestion of Bendectin with birth defects was not 
a matter of common experience, which would prompt use of such 
alternate theories. 226 This finding is ironic because it is exactly the 
kind of information that the trial court should have taken into account 
in a broad review of the proposed polyfurcation. In that context, the 
court might have recognized that the uncommon nature of the cau-
sation issue made it inappropriate for a separate hearing. 
Unlike the Beverly Hills case, which involved a single fire in which 
all of the injuries occurred, this case concerned the unique experi-
ences that hundreds of individuals had with a possibly toxic drug. 227 
A lay jury would have been much better prepared to answer the 
plaintiffs' claims in such a complex case after a complete liability 
presentation. 
The issue tried initially in Anderson v. W.R. Grace & CO.228 related 
more directly to the plaintiffs' particular circumstances than that 
heard first in the Bendectin case. Nevertheless, polyfurcation caused 
a confused and uncertain verdict that was ultimately dismissed. 229 A 
novel environmental pollution claim like that in Anderson necessi-
tates giving the jury contextual background or plaintiffs will seldom 
prevail, and potential environmental dangers will be allowed to con-
tinue. To take an obvious example from Anderson, evidence of when 
the plaintiffs first suffered the effects of leukemia would have given 
the jury a chance to decide when the toxins first might have reached 
the wells. 230 
Prior to the polyfurcation, the Anderson plaintiffs intended to 
make their presentation in a fashion that tracked the development 
of their grievance: the illness; the recognition that many neighbors 
were at the hospital for the same reasons; the suspicion about the 
strange smell in the water; the discovery of the contamination; the 
225 See id. The plaintiffs made this exact argument in their appeal. 
226 [d. at 314. 
227 Judge Jones wrote a separate and hesitant concurrence regarding the polyfurcation order 
in the Bendectin appeal, raising this distinction. [d. at 327 (Jones, J., concurring). Judge 
Jones dissented on the issue of excluding the plaintiffs from the courtroom. [d. at 330. 
228 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986). See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text. 
229 See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text. 
230 See Pacelle, supra note 166, at 77, col. 3. 
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studies conducted that linked the disease to the toxins; and finally, 
tracing the chemicals to the defendants. 231 By structuring their case 
in this way, the plaintiffs could make the relationships of different 
pieces of information apparent to the jury. 232 
Instead of this sequence of presentation, however, the polyfurca-
tion order constrained the plaintiffs to the contamination issue stand-
ing alone in the first trial. Evidence of the onset of the leukemias 
was restricted to the second-phase trial. 233 As the plaintiffs argued 
in opposition to the polyfurcation, the liability issues of the defen-
dants' conduct, plaintiffs' exposure, and plaintiffs' injuries were inex-
tricably linked. 234 Presented with only complex and technical ques-
tions of hydrogeology associated with the contamination, the jury 
was never in a position to evaluate the relevance of one piece of 
information to another because they did not have the whole story. 235 
The various technical dissections and compartmentalizations of the 
trial process had clearly disoriented the jury of laypersons. Jurors 
later told a reporter that they were thrown into "utter shock" when 
they saw the very specific, technical questions in the interrogato-
ries. 236 Until then, they had thought they would be called upon to 
decide simply whether the defendants were liable for injuring the 
plaintiffs, or, in the words of one juror, whether the defendants were 
"guilty or innocent. "237 
The jury suffered from a general misconception about use of the 
term "preponderance of evidence." Some jurors thought the term 
meant that they should quantify the amount of testimony in favor of 
the plaintiffs' proposition, and that they could only find for the 
plaintiffs if there was a larger quantity of evidence in favor of that 
proposition than for other propositions.238 On that basis, the jury 
found that defendant Beatrice had not polluted within the crucial 
"window of liability" because the plaintiffs offered many witnesses 
testifying about dumping solvents on the ground before the "win-
dow" period, but only two witnesses testifying that the defendants 
dumped during that period. 239 
231 See Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 168, at 1; see also Pacelle, supra note 139, at 
77, col. l. 
232 See Pacelle, supra note 166, at 77, col. l. 
233 I d. at 77, col. 2. 
234 Memorandum, supra note 168, at 3. 
235 Pacelle, supra note 166, at 77, col. 3 (statement of plaintiffs' attorney Jan Schlictman). 
236 Pacelle, supra note 166, at 78, col. 4. 
237 ld. 
238 ld. 
239 I d. Specifically, in regard to defendant Beatrice Corporation, the interrogatories asked 
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The jury meant to find defendant W. R. Grace negligent and liable 
for the contamination, and answered the interrogatories with that 
intention. 240 It did not understand the relationship between two 
almost identical questions, however, and contradicted itself in its 
responses to these questions.241 This inconsistency was the basis for 
throwing out the verdict and ordering a new trial. 242 
The confusion evidenced by the jury's inconsistent findings indi-
cated that it did not understand how the issues related to one an-
other. The Gasoline Products test was designed to avoid this type 
of uncertainty and confusion in jury deliberations. Applying the 
standards set out by the Supreme Court in Gasoline Products to the 
Anderson case inevitably leads to the conclusion that the structure 
imposed there was improper because of the jury's inability to grasp 
the significance of its actions. The issues simply were not separate 
and distinct enough for individual hearing. Lacking more informa-
tion, the jury was inhibited in trying to decide the fragmented issues 
presented to it in the interrogatories. This structure unduly preju-
diced the plaintiffs in violation of Rule 42(b), and the substance of 
the jury trial right delineated in Gasoline Products. 
the jurors to determine if the plaintiffs had established by a preponderance of the evidence 
that Beatrice had dumped after 1968. Interrog. No.2 re: Beatrice Corp. See Appendix. There 
had been a great deal of testimony about Beatrice's dumping from the late 1950s to the mid-
1960s, but there were only two witnesses who testified about dumping after 1968. Pacelle, 
supra note 166, at 78, col. 4. The jurors felt that the "preponderance," what they thought of 
as the bulk, of the evidence was about early dumping and therefore responded that the bulk 
of the evidence did not prove that Beatrice dumped during the key period. [d. An answer of 
"No" to that question was the end of deliberations regarding Beatrice because the jury was 
instructed to go no further beyond such an answer. The negative response was equivalent to 
a finding of no liability given the polyfurcated structure of the case, and therefore was 
dispositive of the entire claim. 
240 [d. at 79-80. 
241 [d. First, the jury was asked in Interrogatory No.2 what the earliest date the dumping, 
found to have "substantially contributed" to the wells' pollution in Interrogatory No.1, had 
such an effect. See Appendix. The jury answered "Not determined" because it could not agree 
on an answer. Pacelle, supra note 166, at 79, col. 4. Then, in Interrogatory No.3 it was asked 
whether the pollution resulted from Grace's negligence, which the jury found in the affirmative. 
See Appendix. Interrogatory No.4 was intended to ask the same question as No.2 with the 
additional characterization that waste was dumped negligently. The jurors told the reporter 
who wrote the story that if that was how they understood it then they would have responded 
"Not determined" as they did in No.2. Pacelle, supra note 166, at 80, col. 3. Instead, the 
jurors thought it meant that they should decide when Grace had dumped enough chemicals to 
contaminate the wells, and they agreed on a date proposed by one of them. [d. at 80, col. 2. 
The inconsistency, of course, stems from the fact that, if they could not decide when the 
chemicals got to the wells, they certaiI1ly could not decide when the negligently dumped 
chemicals got there. [d. at 80. 
242 [d. at 80, col. 3. 
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Like the Bendectin and Anderson cases, In re "Agent Orange" 
Product Liability Litigation243 involved the separation of novel cau-
sation issues. 244 Whether Agent Orange caused the injuries experi-
enced by veterans exposed to the toxin in Vietnam's jungles and 
whether that exposure caused the physical defects in the veterans' 
offspring are unique questions outside a jury's common experience. 
Yet, with nothing more than general evidence on the possible toxicity 
and teratogenicity of Agent Orange, the court was ready to submit 
to a jury a single issue that could be dispositive of the claims of 
thousands of plaintiffs. 
If the plaintiffs were exposed to Agent Orange at all, it would 
have occurred in different circumstances and at different levels. 245 
The defendants opposed a class-wide trial solely on general causation 
because a class trial on this issue could never be dispositive of 
individual plaintiff's claims. Any attempt to make class-wide deter-
minations could unduly prejudice defendants in subsequent trials. 246 
All subsequent juries would have to be informed of a blanket deter-
mination that Agent Orange conceivably could cause the plaintiffs' 
injuries. 247 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the class certification, 
but expressed considerable doubt about the significance of the gen-
eral causation issue standing alone. 248 The court accepted the defen-
dants' argument that anything, even water, can be harmful in certain 
circumstances and at certain levels. That argument, it held, "would 
seem to dispose of the [general causation] issue, so defined, without 
more."249 Finding other common issues that supported joining the 
class, the court suggested that the problem with the general cau-
sation issue could be overcome by framing it in different terms, or 
by having class trials on issues other than causation. 
Although Judge Weinstein applied the Gasoline Products test in 
making his polyfurcation order, general causation in the Agent Or-
ange case cannot meet the separate and distinct test. Early in the 
litigation, Judge Pratt ordered the separate initial trial of the man-
ufacturers' affirmative defense. 25o The defendants claimed that they 
243 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N. Y. 1983). 
244 See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text. 
245 100 F.R.D. at 721. 
246Id. at 721-24; see also supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text. 
247 100 F.R.D. at 724. 
248 In re Diamond Shamrock Chern. Co., 725 F.2d 858, 860 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 
1067 (1984). 
249 Id. 
250 In re "Agent Orange" Products Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 762, 785-86 (E.D.N. Y. 
1980). 
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were operating under a government contract and were therefore 
protected from liability. After several years of discovery, Judge 
Pratt repudiated his earlier order because a separate hearing would 
not be possible. 251 The court found that the issues of the affirmative 
defense, liability, and general causation "no longer remain[ed] dis-
crete and separate. "252 In the mind of the court at that time, those 
issues merged to such an extent that a trial on the government 
contract defense would necessarily involve most of the evidence 
needed for trial of the issues relating to liability and general causa-
tion. 253 
Despite his explicit recognition that Judge Pratt had found these 
issues to be inextricably interwoven only months before, Judge 
Weinstein ordered the general causation issue separated for initial 
determination before the other liability and affirmative defense is-
sues. 254 Given the findings of Judge Pratt, it was obvious that hearing 
these issues separately would have been confusing, and at the very 
least would have required duplicative factual presentations. 255 Judge 
Weinstein was similarly undaunted by the later language of the 
Second Circuit questioning the viability of general causation as an 
appropriate issue for separate trial. 256 Either of these reasons should 
have been enough to require unified presentation under Gasoline 
Products, but a polyfurcated structure was maintained up to the 
time of settlement. 
Efficiency and judicial economy were proffered by the court as 
reasons for the polyfurcation. 257 The potential for inducing settle-
ment was also mentioned approvingly several times in Judge Wein-
stein's order. 258 He stated that a trial on general causation "may 
serve to resolve the claims of individual members [of the class] in a 
way that determinations in individual cases would not, by enhancing 
251 In re "Agent Orange" Products Liability Litigation, 565 F. Supp. 1263, 1275-77 
(E.D.N.Y. 1983). 
252 I d. at 1276. 
253 Id. at 1276-77. 
254 In re "Agent Orange" Products Liability Litigation, 100 F.R.D. 718, 722-24 (E.D.N. Y. 
1983). From the language in this order, it seems that Judge Weinstein believed the order of 
hearing the issues would somehow alleviate the problem of interdependence. Deciding cau-
sation, and then turning to the affirmative defense and liability, therefore becomes appropriate. 
Id. at 723. 
255 See Agent Orange, 565 F. Supp. at 1276-77. 
256 In re Diamond Shamrock Chern. Co., 725 F.2d 858,860 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 
1067 (1984). 
257 Efficiency to parties and the court is questionable, however, given the findings of Judge 
Pratt and the Second Circuit. See supra notes 252-56 and accompanying text. 
258 100 F.R.D. at 721, 723. 
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the possibility of settlement among the parties."259 One of plaintiffs' 
attorneys characterized the court's actions regarding the trial struc-
ture as part of the judge's "grand design of settlement. "260 
It can be argued that by selecting the general causation issue for 
a separate initial trial, Judge Weinstein could influence both plaintiffs 
and defendants to settle. 261 Causation was tenuous and difficult for 
the plaintiffs to prove. 262 The defendants, on the other hand, were 
obviously worried that a jury determination of a general causal link 
between Agent Orange and the plaintiffs' injuries would hurt them 
in subsequent trials on specific causation and damages. 263 Thus, each 
party had doubts about a trial limited to general causation, and might 
have been pressured to settle due to that possibility. 
B. Guidelines for Maintaining the Balance Between Efficiency 
and Fairness in Polyfurcation Decisions 
From the foregoing analysis, a number of suggestions emerge to 
help guide courts as they make polyfurcation decisions. By following 
these suggestions, courts can assure fairness and uphold the right 
to a jury trial, and at the same time promote efficiency and economy. 
These suggestions can be summarized as follows: 
1. Fairness and avoidance of prejudice should transcend efficiency 
and economy. 
2. A careful assessment should be made to determine whether a 
smaller trial will be a shorter trial. 
3. Polyfurcation decisions should be made early in the litigation, 
before extensive discovery is conducted on all issues. 
4. Polyfurcation should not be ordered when there is doubt that 
a jury can sufficiently comprehend a narrow issue to be tried indi-
vidually. 
5. Polyfurcation should not be ordered at all where liability issues 
are interdependent. 
6. Causation in fact should be the smallest allowable unit for a 
separate trial. 
259 I d. at 723. 
260 P. SCHUCK, supra note 127, at 139. 
261 See id. at 112-19 (in his first meeting with the parties' attorneys, Weinstein shifted the 
focus onto causation, and said the case would be "better settled than tried"). 
262 In re "Agent Orange" Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 381, at 96 (E.D.N. Y. 
Sept. 25, 1984) (preliminary memorandum and order on settlement) (Judge Weinstein outlines 
in depth all the problems with proving plaintiffs' case, focusing on causation as the central 
problem). 
263 See 100 F.R.D. at 724. 
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7. Inducement to settle should not be used as a justification for 
polyfurcation decisions. 
Fairness is a prominent theme of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, the first Rule of which states that all of the Rules "shall be 
construed to secure the just . . . determination of every action. "264 
When Congress approved the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by 
passing the Rules Enabling Act, it too stressed that the Rules were 
not to "abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right,"265 and 
specifically referred to preserving the right to a jury trial as guar-
anteed by the seventh amendment. 266 Rule 42(b) is a useful compo-
nent of this comprehensive system of rules used to govern civil 
practice in the federal courts. As part of this system, it must be 
applied in conformance with the high standard of fairness that the 
FRCP incorporates. 
Rule 42(b) can promote efficiency and avoid prejudice,267 but it can 
also create problems of illogic, disrupt the coherence of trial pres-
entation, and actually engender prejudice. 268 Case law supports the 
notion that in assessing whether bifurcation is appropriate, concern 
for fairness and the avoidance of prejudice are objectives that tran-
scend the promotion of efficiency or economy. 269 
Even on efficiency grounds, polyfurcation does not necessarily 
meet the goals of Rule 42(b). In regard to both Bendectin and 
Anderson, the time-savings that served as a basis for polyfurcation 
become questionable when one looks at the length of the limited 
first-phase trials. In Anderson, the trial of one aspect of causation 
took seventy-eight trial days.270 In Bendectin, the general causation 
trial lasted twenty-two days.271 If the lengths of these narrow trials 
could be extrapolated to trial of all the issues, then the long duration 
of trials for these discrete issues could be seen as justification for 
polyfurcation. 272 
264 FED. R. Cry. P. 1. 
265 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1938). See supra notes 33--35 and accompanying text. 
266 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. FRCP 38(a) integrates the seventh amendment into the Rules. 
267 See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text. 
268 See supra notes 101-108 and accompanying text. 
269 See, e.g., Martin v. Bell Helicopter, 85 F.R.D. 654, 658 (D. Colo. 1980) ("A paramount 
consideration at all times . . . is a fair and impartial trial to all litigants. Considerations of 
economy of time, money and convenience ... must yield thereto."). 
270 862 F.2d at 914. 
271 857 F.2d at 316. 
272 See In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Products Liability Litigation, 624 F. 
Supp. 1212, 1221 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (just such an argument is made by the court, which projects 
that the "Bendectin litigation alone had the capability of substantially immobilizing the Federal 
Judiciary"). 
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Arguably, however, the narrowed issues received virtually as 
much trial time, and certainly as much preparation, media attention, 
and ego, as a unified trial would have received. Separate trial of 
these issues, therefore, potentially could have doubled the amount 
of trial time, or more, if the full case ultimately had proceeded to a 
verdict. Accordingly, the fractured polyfurcated structures could be 
the very cause of the drawn-out presentations on such narrow issues, 
and not necessarily a dramatic time-saver overall. 
Most polyfurcation decisions come at the close of discovery and 
often very near trial time. 273 The parties prepare for full presentation 
along traditional lines, only to be fettered by a restricted trial struc-
ture. For plaintiffs' lawyers in particular, the natural response may 
well be to extend possibly their only opportunity to get evidence 
before a jury, and to explore every potentiai avenue no matter how 
dubious. Whereas the separated issue might have taken up a small 
fraction of a unified trial, it grows out of proportion when it becomes 
potentially an all-or-nothing opportunity for plaintiffs. 
Judicial economy is often a self-sufficient rationale for making more 
and more divisions in trial structures, and should be rethought in 
light of these potential contradictions. Courts should not blindly 
assume that smaller trials equal shorter trials. Instead, they should 
conduct an informed balancing of the benefits and burdens of poly-
furcation as the Rule's drafters envisioned.274 Structural decisions 
should also be made early enough in a case that unnecessary discov-
ery can be postponed until after the initial trial or trials. This practice 
would further reduce the duration of many cases, and possibly limit 
the effects of the all-or-nothing mentality that polyfurcation engen-
ders. 
The Anderson case also demonstrates that complex environmental 
tort cases may cause sufficient jury confusion to merit a retrial. 275 
The purpose of the Rule is not served when retrials result from 
splintered hearing of liability issues that induce the jury into giving 
an invalid verdict. If a court doubts that a jury could comprehend 
sufficiently a narrow issue standing alone, then it should not permit 
the separation of issues. 276 
273 See supra notes 167-76, 231-S5 and accoinpanying text. 
274 See supra notes 24-S1 and accompanying text. 
275 See supra notes 230-42 and accompanying text. 
276 Payne v. A.O. Smith Corp., 578 F. Supp. 533, 539 (1983) (bifurcation denied because it 
was "equally likely that bifurcaLion, as suggested by the defendants, will extend the time of 
trial, rather than shorten it"); Kahnke v. Herter, 579 l'. Supp. 1523, 1526 (D. Minn. 1984) 
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In addition to the problem of defeating efficiency by necessitating 
retrials, jury confusion has an even more troubling potential for 
unfairness. The extent of a jury's confusion will not always be as 
evident as it was in Anderson, and unsound verdicts will be allowed 
to stand. Environmental tort causation is so complex and so far 
outside the common experience of ordinary jurors that fractured 
causation presentations in this context necessarily leave jurors with-
out sufficient information on which to base a valid verdict. It is 
difficult to understand, for example, how a lay jury could determine 
fairly the claims of thousands of sick and dying Vietnam veterans 
and their children based solely on the hypothetical question of 
whether Agent Orange was toxic and teratogenic. 277 
Exclusion of many of the Bendectin plaintiff children due to the 
extremely limited scope of their one and only trial highlights another 
way that polyfurcation can distort a jury trial. 278 By presenting the 
jury with no evidence about the experience of the particular plaintiffs 
and by allowing only apparently healthy children into the courtroom, 
the Bendectin judge created an atmosphere of confusion and mis-
apprehension in which to decide the plaintiffs' very serious claims. 
Many cases will involve interdependent issues that require a uni-
fied liability presentation in order to avoid jury confusion and un-
necessary doubling of presentations. The allegations of fraudulent 
scientific studies in Bendectin should have been presented along with 
those studies in order to give the jury some way to assess their 
credibility.279 This is but one example of how relevant evidence can 
be excluded by limiting too narrowly the scope of a trial. 
The problem of interdependent issue separation is compounded by 
the presence of cross-over issues, which often must be relitigated in 
subsequent trials when plaintiffs prevail in the initial phases. As the 
first judge in the Agent Orange case discovered, the issues there 
were so interwoven that most of the evidence needed for general 
causation would also be needed for the liability and affirmative de-
fense issues. 28o If the plaintiffs had won in the first phase, they would 
have had to present much of the same evidence to the subsequent 
jury or juries, thereby defeating any supposed judicial economy and 
actually making the overall trial longer. Polyfurcation, therefore, 
(bifurcation denied because defendants "concede[d) they [were) not sure that bifurcating 
liability and damages [would) save time"). 
277 See supra notes 243-49 and accornpan:.'ing text. 
278 See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text. 
279 See supra notes 219-21 and ac~ompanying text. 
280 See supra notes 250-53 and accompanying text. 
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should not be ordered when there are significant cross-over issues 
that must be retried in later phases. 
The functional analysis conducted in this Comment shows that the 
divisions made in Anderson, Bendectin, and Agent Orange were in 
all probability overly narrow and abstracted the plaintiffs' claims 
from reality. Hypothetical questions of general causation, removed 
from all connections to the circumstances that led a plaintiff to bring 
suit, are an improper foundation for a verdict on an entire claim. 
Divisions that go beyond causation in fact, the combination of general 
and specific causation, cannot meet the Gasoline Products distinct 
and separable test. 
The polyfurcation ordered by the court in Beverly Hills consti-
tuted a distinctly triable unit. General and specific causation in the 
context of a fire at a restaurant gave the jury enough information 
to determine the validity of the plaintiffs' claims properly and 
fairly.281 Polyfurcation of causation in fact like that in Beverly Hills, 
therefore, should be the furthest allowable separation, if polyfurca-
tion is deemed appropriate at all. 
When bifurcation is taken to the extreme exhibited in Anderson, 
Bendectin, and Agent Orange, the role of the jury is transformed 
from that of an impartial factfinder and social conscience into that of 
a sort of special master assigned technical questions removed from 
a particular case or controversy. Rule 42(b) contains the specific 
guarantee that the right to jury trial as established by the seventh 
amendment to the Constitution shall be "preserv[ed] inviolate."282 
Gasoline Products, along with many subsequent decisions, make 
clear that the drafters of the seventh amendment were concerned 
with the substance of the common law right and not with the form 
that it took. 283 The change in form that Rule 42(b) bifurcation per-
mits, therefore, does not offend the seventh amendment per se. The 
transgression occurs when the substance of that right is changed by 
a procedural rule such that the role of the jury is mutated. Juries 
are meant to be impartial to the claims of both parties, but the- jury 
was never meant to be detached from the reality and humanity of 
those claims. 
Polyfurcation of narrow and sometimes hypothetical questions vi-
olates the command of the seventh amendment and Rule 42(b), which 
guarantee the preservation of the right to a jury trial. Polyfurcation 
281 See supra notes 189-97 and accompanying text. 
282 FED. R. Cry. P. 42(b). See supra note 18 for the text of the Rule. 
283 Gasoline Prod. Co. v. Champlin Refineries, 283 U.S. 494, 497-98 (1931). 
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of causation issues in Anderson, Bendectin, and Agent Orange also 
violated each of the criteria listed in Rule 42(b) and the Gasoline 
Products test, which courts habitually use to evaluate propriety of 
bifurcation orders. Unified presentation of liability issues would have 
prevented these various problems, and therefore would have been 
consistent with the fairness standards of the FRCP and the tort 
system as a whole. 
Inducement to settle, furthermore, is neither one of the goals of 
Rule 42(b), nor one of the allowable grounds for making a bifurcation 
decision. 284 There is a real possibility that judges will use the burdens 
imposed by polyfurcation to try to induce settlements in order to 
clear their admittedly overcrowded dockets. It appears that this 
occurred in the Agent Orange litigation. 285 The Agent Orange court's 
own statements about settlement inducement, added to the dupli-
cative nature of the trials that would have resulted, indicated that 
settlement was at least a part of the judge's basis for polyfurcating 
the trial. 286 Such a potentially prejudicial use of Rule 42(b) should 
be rejected as improper. 
Courts must recognize that polyfurcation in environmental tort 
cases in particular, and indeed in all complex litigation, can produce 
prejudice and defeat the purposes of Rule 42(b) as it did in the cases 
discussed above. The guidelines set out in this Section, and hopefully 
in future applications of the prudential considerations noted in this 
Comment, define standards that the appellate courts should seek to 
enforce in their reviews of polyfurcation decisions in the trial courts. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Polyfurcation of tort liability issues is a recent development, and 
it has occurred with little or no critical discussion by scholars. Po-
lyfurcation has proved to be an unpredictable next step in the evo-
lution of Rule 42(b), which is now commonly used to separate liability 
and damages issues for trial. The device, as it has been used in 
environmental tort litigation, raises serious questions of propriety 
that concentrate primarily on potential prejudice to the parties. Both 
plaintiffs and defendants can be adversely affected by polyfurcation. 
Applying a test developed by the Supreme Court for determining 
the suitability of issues for divided trials, this Comment analyzes 
284 FED. R. Cry. P. 42(b). See supra note 18 for the text of the Rule. 
285 See supra notes 258-63 and accompanying text. 
286Id. 
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serious defects that arose in three major environmental cases that 
applied polyfurcation within liability. Separated issues turned out to 
be not so distinct and separable that their independent hearing could 
be had without injustice. The issues of liability in these cases were 
often too interwoven to be separated. 
Juries have decided plaintiffs' claims based solely on hypothetical 
general causation issues completely detached from the circumstances 
experienced by the particular plaintiff. This structure does not pre-
serve the substantive nature of the right to a jury trial guaranteed 
by the seventh amendment and echoed in Rule 42(b). The verdict in 
Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., for example, was so confused by 
the truncation of evidence presented and the form of jury interro-
gatories submitted that the entire trial was tainted and a new trial 
was ordered. The primary goal of Rule 42(b) is to promote efficiency 
and economy in federal civil litigation. Polyfurcation that results in 
retrial not only fails to promote this goal, but actually exacerbates 
the congestion in federal courts. 
Another example of the potential for prejudice resulting from 
polyfurcation is provided in In re "Agent Orange" Products Liability 
Litigation. There, a federal appellate court disapproved the trial 
court's polyfurcation of general causation because it lacked any con-
nection to the circumstances of the members of the large and varied 
plaintiff class. The trial court in that case continued with the poly-
furcated structure, and openly admitted that inducement to settle 
was one reason for the polyfurcation order. Settlement is not a basis 
for bifurcation decisions provided by Rule 42(b), and is therefore 
inappropriate. 
Because polyfurcation of significant liability issues in tort claims 
is a new phenomenon, it has not yet gained a great deal of momen-
tum. This Comment suggests, in Section IV, a list of guidelines that 
should define the terms of when polyfurcation should and should not 
be ordered. Developing rules for employing polyfurcation like those 
outlined there, or making the determination that polyfurcation is 
inappropriate in any complex environmental tort case, is therefore 
still feasible and desirable. Congress could clarify the Rule legisla-
tively, but this course does not appear to be necessary if appellate 
courts review the problem conscientiously and impose reasonable 
limitations on the use of polyfurcation. 
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APPENDIX 
The following are the jury interrogatories submitted in Anderson 
v. W.R. Grace & Co., regarding defendant W.R. Grace & Co. They 
can be found in Pacelle, Contaminated Verdict, Am. Law., Dec. 
1986, at 77. 
1 Have the plaintiffs established by a preponderance of the evidence 
• that any of the following chemicals were disposed of at the Grace site 
after October 1, 1964 and SUbstantially contributed to the contamination of 
Wells G and H by these chemicals prior to May 22, 1979? 
A. TRICHLOROETHYLENE? Yes ____ No ____ _ 
B. TETRACHLOROETHYLENE? Yes __ No __ 
C. 1,2 TRANSDICHLOROETHYLENE? Yes __ No __ 
[If you have answered "No" to all these chemicals, you need not proceed 
further.] 
2 If you have answered "Yes" in Question 1 as to any chemical(s), what, 
• according to the preponderance of the evidence, was the earliest time 
that such chemical(s) disposed of on the Grace site after October 1, 1964 
made a substantial contribution to the contamination of Wells G and H-
with respect to 
A. TRICHLOROETHYLENE? 
B.TETRACHLOROETHYLENE? 
C. 1,2 TRANSDICHLOROETHYLENE? 
Month Year 
[If, on the evidence before you, you are unable to determine by a prepon-
derance of the evidence the appropriate date, write "ND" for Not Deter-
mined.] 
'1 If you have answered "Yes" in Question 1 as to any chemical(s), please 
i). answer the following question: 
Have the plaintiffs established by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the substantial contribution to the contamination of Wells G and H prior to 
May 22, 1979 by chemicals disposed of on the Grace site after October 1, 
1964 was caused by the negligence of Grace, that is, the failure of Grace to 
fulfill any duty of due care to the plaintiffs-with respect to 
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A. TRICHLOROETHYLENE? 
B.TETRACHLOROETHYLENE? 
Yes __ No __ _ 
Yes __ No __ _ 
C. 1,2 TRANSDICHLOROETHYLENE? Yes __ No __ 
[Only answer with respect to a chemical as to which you answered "Yes" 
on question 1.] 
4 If you have answered "Yes" to any part of question 3, what, according 
• to a prepondereance [sic] of the evidence, was the earliest time at 
which the substantial contribution referred to in question 3 was caused by 
the negligent conduct of this defendant-with respect to 
A. TRICHLOROETHYLENE? 
B.TETRACHLOROETHYLENE? 
C. 1,2 TRANSDICHLOROETHYLENE? 
Month Year 
[If, on the evidence before you, you are unable to determine by a prepon-
derance of the evidence the appropriate date, write "ND" for Not Deter-
mined.] 
